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PREFACE
/

The original idea for this book was conceived in the winter
of 1952.

I had consulted Richard.McKeon, my advisor in the

philosophy department at the University of Chicago, about my
forthcoming Master's dissertation.

He, knowing my particular

religious background, suggested that I aim eventually at attempting to state Luther's philosophic position and that my
work be a preliminary for it.

~fuster's

As nearly as I can summarize his

remarks he said, "Luther needs to be looked at from a philosopher's standpoint.

I think there is a fresh viewpoint there

which has been hidden under the debris of the past few centuries.
So far as I know, no one, at least
the philosophic Luther.
he wrote is wordy.

rec~ntly,

has tried to get at

The trouble with him is that everything

You have to dig through a lot of rhetoric to

get at his thought.

He's a very unsystematic fellow.

The most

fruitful place to look will probably be his De Servo Arbitrio.
Fourteen years later, I took up the task in earnest.
Whether what f ollov7s satisfies the deroands of the task laid down
a decade and a half ago, I am not in a position to judge.

If it

does, much of the credit belongs to Richard McKeon, who not only
set the task, but, to a great extent equipped me intellectually
to undertake it.

If it fails to meet the demands of the task,

the fault is mine.
The claim has often been made that Luther was opposed to

iii
philosophy.

Certainly there are passages in his writings which

can be cited to support such a position. . "Philoso~y is the
theology of heathen and of rationalists. 111 Philosophy is "a
study of futility and perdition.

•••

•

Do not attempt to sup-

port and defend philosophy; rather study it as we study evil arts
and mistaken positions, to destroy and to refute them. 112
Luther's sharpest criticisms are reserved for Aristotle.

"I

am heartsick that this damned, cocky mischievous heathen has
deluded and fooled so many of the best Christians with his false
ideas.

He has been sent as a plague to God because of our sins.

•••

His book on ethics is the worst of all books.

•

Away with such books.

Keep them away from Christians.

•••
•••

•
•

I have lectured and heard lectures on him, and I understand him
better than did St. Thomas or Scotus.•• 3
Twelve years later, on the other hand, Luther told a friend,
Veit Dietrich,

11

Aristotle is very good in the area of moral

philosophy. 114
Cicero is frequently praised by Luther.

11

If anyone wants

1 n. Martin Luthers Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe
(Weimarer Ausgabe), ~ischreden V, tr. A. Freitag, Weimar: Herman
B8hlaUs Nachfolger, 1908, no.· 5557. Subsequent references to the
Weimar edition will be noted as "WA", followed by volume number
in Roman Numerals and page reference or item citation in arabic.
2
commentary £n St. Paul's Epistle!£ the Romans,
WA LVI, p. 372.
3Letter to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation
~the Reform of the Christian Estate, WA VI-,-p:-458.
4wA, Tischreden I, no. 411.

--·
iv
real philosophy he ought to read Cicero." 5
excellent philosopher; •••

•

"Cicero was an

I hope our Lord God will be

gracious to him and his kind •••

.

•

.

/

Finally, "Cicero wrote and

taught brilliantly about virtues, prudence and other matters;
likewise Aristotle about ethics, brilliantly and learnedly.

The

books of both are certainly very useful and very necessary for
the conduct of this life. 117
How can these seemingly contradictory remarks be reconciled?
Luther's criticism of philosophy is not a criticism of the philosophie discipline itself, but of the attempt to use philosophy as
a substitute for theology.

"He must carefully distinguish be8
tween philosophy and theology."
"Aristotle depicts for us a

god of this sort: who is sleeping and permits anyone to use or
9
abuse his longsuffering and chastening at will."
Rational discovery and Christian revelation are mutually exclusive.

The need

for both theology and philosophy in the discovery of truth is not
thereby excluded.

'Hhile for Luther philosophy cannot discover

the way to God or provide the truth about Him and the human condition relative to Him, it is necessary for the conduct of this

5wA Tischreden II, no. 2412b.
r.,.JA Tischreden III, nos. 3904, 3925.
7 corn.rnentary on Chapter Nine of Isaiah, vlA XXXX, III,

6

p. 608.
8

Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle !Q the Galatians,
WA XXXX, I, p. 410.
9
on Bound Choice, WA XVIII, p. 706.

v

present 1 1. f e. 10
My suspicion that there could be found in·Luth7r's writings
at least the rudiments of a philosophic position was aroused by
the fact that in the De Servo Arbitrio, there are found a number
of philosophic questions, issues raised by Erasmus, to which
Luther gives philosophic ansHers.

He argues on philosophic

grounds to a given position, makes philosophic distinctions, opts
for a particular philosophic position to the exclusion of others,
and proceeds dialectically in his examination of materials.
Both he and Erasmus purport to be arguing their respective
cases on "scripture alone".

Yet, Hhen they divide on the meaning

and import of a particular passage, of necessity they move beyond
"scripture alone" to grarnmatical analys·is to get at the meaning,
and philosophical analysis to get at the import of the passage or
to expose fallacies in the other's reasoning or assumptions.
A philosophical debate, however, might yield only bits and
pieces which, interesting as they might be historically, would
have little if any philosophic value, since they could not be
linked up into a coherent body of thought, the implications of
which might profitably be developed.
The next clue to Luther's thinking was provided by his
insistence on describing divine activity in terms of liberum
10 see citation 7. Cicero and Aristotle are "necessary
for the conduct of this life."

vi
i urn. 11
.
ar b ~tr

That kind of approach had its precedents in Scotus,

Ockham and Biel.

The tradition of the latter two had shaped

Luther's educational experiences.

/

Contrary to that tradition,

however, Luther argues that divine liberum arbitrium excludes the
possibility of human liberum arbitrium.

An analysis of this con-

cept of liberum arbitrium, distinguishing the characteristics
entailed by it, and what it implied about the nature of human
action as affected by it led to the isolation and relating of the
materials found in Part A of Chapter II.
From an ethical standpoint, then, Luther had presented a
philosophic explanation for the existence of goodness, namely,
the activity of an entity exercising liberum arbitrium.
what about the existence of evil?

But

The available material in

Luther was scanty, but adequate to the task.

It necessitated to

some extent going outside the De Servo Arbitrio.
are found in the latter portion of Chapter II.

These materials

What they revea 1

is three additional kinds of activity within the over-riding
activity of divine liberum arbitrium, Satanic opposition (a
principle of destruction), divine'recreative activity (reconciling the opposition back into conformity to the divine intent) and
11 1 have used the expression liberum arbitrium as a
technical expression, usually untranslated, since it would often
appear clumsy or artificial in English translation and sometimes
would be confused with voluntas.

vii
human existential activity.
With respect to the last activity, the problem with which I
/

wrestled for some time was this: if, as Luther claims, everything
can be explained in terms of ontological determination by divine
free activity, how is it possible for man to exercise choice over
the things which are beneath him", a claim which Luther also
makes? 12
11

The problem was resolved by isolating what it is in human
action which is accounted for by the first three kinds of
ity.

activ•~

Whatever was left over is the uniquely human contribution.

The first activity accounts for man's being.

The second and

third account for his inner impulses to action, his urges and
adventitious ideas.

What is left is the capacity to deliberate

over these urges and ideas prior to action.
The four kinds of activities resolve themselves into a three
level hierarchy of relationships to which I gave the names:
ontological, manichaean and existential.
was to test the hierarchy for consistency.

.

What was necessary next
Since it was a hier-

archy of activities, as opposed, for instance, to a hierarchy .of:
ideas, the problem reduced to justifying the activities in relation to one another.

This.task occupies Chapter III.

Finally, I moved beyond the structure which had been created
to an examination of what it implied about the nature of human
12

see quotation 34 and footnote 36 of Chapter lJ..

viii
action, to the question of the relation between inner motivation
(quite literally "being moved") and outer action.

Chapter IV
/

exhibits the results of that examination.

Given then that

explanation of human action, it was a simple task to exhibit the
nature of human ethical problems and the approach to ethics which
follows from it.
Briefly, then, this recapitulates the process of analysis
of which the chapters which follow are a synthesis.

1 have

attempted to set forth as simply and, at the same time, in as
organized a fashion as 1 could, the philosophic foundation of
Luther's ethics.

Consequently, 1 have tried to keep to a minimum

commentary on his words, letting them speak for themselves as
much as possible.

Occasionally 1 have departed from this resolve

to comment in a footnote on a point which 1 thought was interesting in the light of subsequent philosophic history.

Needless to

say, much more could have been said.
The first chapter provides Luther's educational background,
functioning as an intellectual frame to set off the image within
it.

Chapter 11 is largely an effort to sort out the pieces of

Luther's thought and to connect them to one another in a coherent
whole.

Where a logical argument is lacking to relate the ideas,

1 have supplied what 1 felt was appropriate.

The task, in a

sense, was similar to that of an art restorer, attempting to fit
together the bits and pieces of a statue long ago shattered.
Sometimes, where there ia a piece missing, he must fashion a

,.

ix
substitute piece.

Hopefully, my little pieces of plaster of

Paris blend with Luther's marble.

Fortunately, there are not
/

many of them.

I have indicated where they occur.

Chapter Ill functions as the test for consistency of the
thought structure which emerges after all the pieces of Luther's
thought had been put together.

The test items were developed by

Erasmus; the responses by Luther.
Chapter IV initiates a departure from the explicit expression of Luther's thought to -the implications of his position.

I

use a distinction for which he is famous, law/gospel, and apply
it to the entire structure of his thought.

The result exhibits

the possible directions in which his thought can be extended,
only a few of which he himself developed in print.

His pro-

fessional career was devoted almost exclusively to exploring what
I have labeled the manichaean level of activity.
The final chapter exhibits Luther's approach in contrast to
three other kinds of approaches to action.

Apart from the

reasons stated in the text for handling the matter in this fashion, 1 felt that it was necessary some,.,rhere in these pages to
exhibit structural incompatibilities with other kinds of philosophie approaches, particularly since Luther's approach has been
confused at times by Lutherans with at least two of the contrasting approaches.

For instance, after Luther's death Melanchthon

became the leading Lutheran theologian.

Nelanchthon by that time

had become a thorougheoing Aristotelian

and, unconsciously I am

X

sure, attempted to formulate Luther's thought teleologically.
Again, for a variety of reasons, usually non-7heological,
Lutherans and Calvinists have often found themselves in a common
camp, first in Europe and later in America.
approach is essentially deontic.

The Calvinistic

The subtle effect of this

association with European Calvinism and American Puritanism has
tended to modify the original Lutheran approach.

Part of the

task of isolating Luther's philosophic approach, as a result, has
been to remove the Calvinist-ic deontic patina and, beneath that
the Melanchthonian telic patina, in order that the original metal
shaped by Luther can be exposed and examined on its own merits.
Except where indicated the translations are mine.
used the Weimar Edition of Luther wherever possible.

I have
My second

critical resource has been the St. Louis German Edition.

The

primary text for Luther's position has been his De Servo
Arbitrio.

I have gone outside that work only where necessary to

supplement or to clarify ideas that work contains.
Several passages from Helanchthon's Loci Communes of 1521,
are cited as Luther's position because Luther himself in the
De Servo Arbitrio gave that book his highest praise and unqualified approval.

I have also quoted upon occasion from the con-

fessional documents of the Lutheran Church, but only such
documents as Luther is known to have read and approved.

These

quotations from sources outside Luther constitute only a minor
portion of the material on which the book is based.

xi
1 am indebted to Nr. Robert Coburn of the Department of
Philosophy at the University of Chicago for the technique of the
.

/

antilogism used in Chapter tiL The second antilogism in that
chapter was developed in another context while 1 was working as a
student under him about nine years ago.
Finally, 1 am indebted to Dr. F. Torrens Hecht S.J., former
chairman of the Philosophy Department of Loyola University, for
encouraging me in this undertaking and for making my work
possible, and to Dr. Francis· Catania, the present chairman, who
suggested the possibility of a wider readership than 1 envisioned
and gently guided me in that direction, pointing out and helping
me to remove the philosophic boulders which stood in the way of
completing the task.

P·

TABLE OF CONTENTS
/

Page
PREFACE • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

ii

Chapter
I.

II.

III.

IV.

v.

THE SETTING OF LUTHER'S THOUGHT • • • • • • • •
LIBERUM ARBITRIUM--THE PROBLEM OF GOOD
AND EVIL • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Ontological Determinism
The Manichaean Dialectic
The Existential Implication: Human
Freedom and Action

1

25

DETERMINISM AND ACTION--THE PROBLEM OF
JUSTICE • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 57
Challenge One: The Justice of God
Challenge Two: Divine Hord and Work
Challenge Three: Validity of the Ethical
"Ought"
Challenge Four: Human Action and Divine
Response
ACTION AND MOTIVATION--THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
LUTHER'S ETHIC • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Action and Motivation
Motivation and Action
MOTIVATION AND LIFE--THE DIRECTION OF
LUTHER'S ETHIC • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
The Anti-Hedonic Principle
The Anti-Telic Principle
The Anti-Deontic rrinciple

BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

73

96

123

/

Religion deals existentially with the meaning
of being; philosophy deals theoretically with
the structure of being. But religion can express itself only through the ontological
elements and categories with which philosophy
deals, while philosophy can discover the
structure of being only to the degree to
which being-itself has become manifest in an
existential experience.
Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1

CHAPTER I
~

SETTING OF LUTHER'S THOUGHT

/

Martin Luther's reputation as a great thinker in the tradition of the western world rests largely on his contributions to
theology and his effect on political affairs.

He is not noted as

a philosopher; certainly he did not found a new school of philosophy as did Descartes or Kant.

Yet, one can with profit examine

Luther the Philosopher in contrast to Luther the Theologian,
Luther the Politician and Luther the Educator, even as one can
profitably study in similar contrast Augustine the Philosopher or
Thomas Aquinas the Philosopher.
The great churchmen, beginning with Augustine, were both
philosophers and theologians.

Augustine and Aquinas never pro-

duced a system of philos.ophy, collected in one or a set of
volumes in clear logical order; so also Luther, though he wrote
much on many topics, never gathered the body of his thought in a
simple distillate of philosophic concentration to give order and
integrity to the vast range of his thought.

Yet, the foundations

are there, the germinal ideas scattered liberally in his writings,
waiting to be gathered up and arranged in systematic order.
Luther did not fancy himself a philosopher.

Though a

lecturer in philosophy for a time at Erfurt and Wittenberg, he
preferred the rich contents of theology to the formal structures
which passed for philosophy in his. day.

He wanted to feast .on

~~--~------------------------~------~---------,
2

the meat of theology; let someone else gnaw on the bones of
philosophy.

Yet, for all that, he was philosophic, an original
/

thinker, laying out for himself a new pathway of thought in an
age struggling out of the middle
no philosophic disciples.

~ges

into the modern.

He gained

Those who followed him in thought

followed for theological or political reasons.

And when he died

his philosophic insights were lost sight of--if they had ever
been seen--so that when German philosophy rose to the ascendancy
in Europe a century later, it was a different kind of philosophy
which-was produced by the Lutherans, Leibniz, Wolff and Kant.
Yet Luther's philosophic thought has survived, buried in his
theology, unnoticed and unheeded, waiting to be separated out so
it can be organized and expanded.

The .living body of his theology,

still practiced and believed, retains within itself the skeleton
of his philosophic thought.
There have been attempts ever and again to formulate
Luther's ethic and politic--a relatively easy task since he wrote
so copiously on both subjects--yet these are but the outcomes of
his philosophic thought, not the foundations.

They describe the

steps which a person rightly takes, the actions which he properly
performs, but they are not meaningful until one first has identified the person and isolated the spirit which shapes the actions,
causes the steps and gives them meaning--as Luther was always wont
to insist.

Thus, one inevitably must get back to Luther the

Philosopher to understand Luther the Theologian, Luther the

pt
3

Ethicist and Politician and, what is more significant today, to
understand the genius of Lutheranism which distinguishes it from
/

the genius of Catholicism or Calvinism.

To understand Lutheran-

ism one must read the mind of Luther, for Lutheranism has, by and
large, remained faithful to him and his thought has survived 450
eventful years in surprisingly vital fashion.
archaic; he has not worn well.

Calvin has grown

But Luther is still alive.

Yet,

Luther the Philosopher remains relatively unknown and unrecognized.
The reasons for the lack of recognition of the philosophic
side of Luther are many.

Luther, if he thought of himself as

anything, thought of himself as a Bible interpreter and preacher,
not a philosopher.

The theological curriculum of his day was

structured in such a way that the epitome of scholarly attainment
the Doctor of Divinity degree, entitled one officially to comment
independently on Scripture itself.

Prior to that attainment one

made his scholarly contributions within the relatively safe
confines of the Sentences. 1 One noted the insights implicit in
1The Four Books of Sentences was compiled by Peter
Lombard (c 1100:rr60764). -rt was probably the most influential
book in education and in the development of philosophical and
theological thought from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries. According to Richard McKeon it was virtually the center
of the university curriculum by the middle of the thirteenth
century. Selections from Medieval Philosophers, I, ed. & tr.
Richard McKeon, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929, p. 185.
The four books cover the chief problems of theology according to
the following structure. The question is introduce~ after which
pertinent scripture passages are cited, followed by quotations

p.
4

the compendium of great men's ideas about the fundamental issues
of mankind.

But the Doctor of Divinity interpreted the thoughts

of God to his fellowmen.

/

Luther attained that degree and devoted

himself assiduously to that task both by way of commentary,
translation, and sermon. 2 The bulk of his academic output:
from the church fathers and more recent theologians on the topic.
Lombard did not attempt to reconcile apparent contradictions in
the authorities cited. The book is a handy compendium of the
best thinking in the church to his time on the topics treated.
Some of the leading theologians in the medieval church after his
time wrote commentaries on the Sentences. See also Stanley J.
Curtis, "Peter Lombard, a Pioneer in Educa tiona 1 Method",
Miscellanea Lombardiana, Novara, 1957, pp. 265-273. A new
critical edition of the ~ of Sentences will be published
shortly by Quaracchi in Florence, Italy.
2Luther received the Doctorate in Divinity on October
19, 1512 from Wittenberg University. On the 22nd he was inducted
into office as a member of the Theological Faculty. On the 25th
be began a series of lectures on Genesis (1512-1513). He lectured on the Psalms (1513-1515), Romans (1515-1516), Galatians
(1516-1517) and Hebrews (1517-1518). He was involved with
matters having to do with his public protest against indulgence
sales for several years. When he returned to the classroom he
began exegetical lectures again. Between 1512 and 1546 he
delivered a series of sixteen lectures on 13 books of the Bible.
He translated the Bible from Hebrew and Greek into vernacula.r
German for the benefit of his countrymen. Beginning in 1514 he
preached frequently, first at Wittenberg as chaplain to the
university and the community, and later in many parts of Germany.
His early lectures exhibit great dependence on traditional
commentaries and follow typical methods of exposition followed at
his time. Later lectures, beginning with those on Romans, are
freer and exhibit an approach which depends on grammatical
analysis of the original language of the texts and interprets the
text in a literal fashion (thereby departing from the traditional
four-fold manner of interpretation: literal, allegorical, tropological and anagogical). For an extend~d treatment of Luther's
early lectures see Mackinnon, James, Luther and the Reformation,
I, London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1925, chapters V and VI, and
Schwiebert, E. G., Luther and~ times, St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1950, chapter 9.

P'·
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commentaries, sermons, the translation of the Old and New Testament, flow from that function.

And yet, near the end of his life
/

he valued most highly of all that he had produced, the
Arbitrio, the most philosophic of his works. 3

~

Servo

Much of his formal education was shaped in the ~ moderna
tradition of Ockham and Biel. 4 And, though he departed from them
3 In 1537 Luther wrote to Wolfgang Capito who wished to
publish Luther's complete works, that he did not care what
happened to his books. The only works with which he was satisfied were his De Servo Arbitrio and his catechism. WA Briefe
VIII, no. 3162:.
4 The ill moderna, a name espoused by the nomina lists,
Ockham, Biel and others, to distinguish themselves from the
realistic tradition of Thomas and his disciples which they called
the i l l antigua, is an approach to philosophy which actually
begins with Duns Scotus (1266/74-1308). Scotus taught, in
opposition to the thomistic position, that the soul of man is a
self-contained reality, a will, rather than the instantiation of
a generic idea, a mind. Ockham (c 1285-1349), like Scotus an
English Franciscan, followed the direction of Scotus' thought and
developed a thoroughgoing nominalist position. Knowledge arises
from the inner experience of external individual things. He
rejected the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions of
medieval realism. The evidential basis of all knowledge is the
direct experience of individual things and particular events.
The human mind intuitively apprehends existent individuals, their
sensible qualities and its own acts. It understands them by
means of cognitive language. Language has a semantic structure
and contains within it an ontological commitment. One must,
therefore, distinguish between things and their characteristics
and signs and their ontological commitments. Universality is a
characteristic of signs, not things. Whatever is not selfcontradictory is possible. What is actual cannot be established
by reason alone but depends upon experience. Since God is not
experienced, His nature can be described by negative signs, but
cannot be demonstrated. He is known only by revelation. There
is a sharp cleavage between reason and revelation, knowledge and
faith. Hence, reason cannot help solve problems of faith.
Ockham's most productive years were spent at the University of
Paris and in southern Germany. Among his disciples was Gabriel
Biel, (c 1410-1495) the German nominalist, who achieved fame at

~--~--~~-~----=--------------------------~--------------------------d

..
6

to a form of Christian Platonism which approximates Augustine's,
he shared with them the belief in the distinction between reve/

la.tion and reason, between theology and philosophy.

To that

belief must be credited his many remarks attacking and belittling
the philosophers, notably Aristotle, as a hindrance to theology.
Philosophy and theology tread separate paths.
It is not surprising, then, that he developed no systematic
treatment of his thought.

Here and there one finds fragmentary

pieces, sometimes in surprising places: a lengthy aside in the
body of a commentary, a paragraph extemporized in the midst of a
sermon, or arguments sprinkled liberally in the work which forms
the basis for this study of his philosophic thought, the
Arbitrio.

~

Servo

One cannot help but feel, reading the De Servo

Arbitrio, that underlying it is a complete philosophic structure,
fully thought out, whose most prominent parts alone find expression in his writings.

Not too surprisingly one finds that as

a student at Erfurt University his intimates thought of him as
TUbingen University. A number of Luther's professors at Erfurt
studied under Biel, among them Johann Staupitz, (1459-1524) the
Preceptor of the Augustinian order at Erfurt which Luther
entered, and Nathin. Luther studied Bie1 1 s Canon of the Mass
with Staupitz. He studied Biel 1 s commentary on the ~ £f
Sentences with Nathin in preparation for the Sententiarius
diploma. For a more detailed treatment of the via moderna at
Erfurt University, see Fife, Robert Herndon, The Revolt of Martin
Luther, New York: Columbia University Press, 1957, chapter 4.
For an examination of Ockham's epistemology see McKeon,~· cit.,
II, pp. 351-421.

pt
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the philosopher of their group. 5

He was the clear and careful

thinker, the one with the original ideas and careful arguments.
/

Like Augustine, he underwent a time of psychological testing
which had both its spiritual and intellectual sides.
Lutheran Confession to compare with that of Augustine.

We have no
There are

comments made to companions at table, preserved in second hand
6
sources, asides in various of his .works, a brief autobiographic
7
sketch prefacing the first edition of his Latin works , but no
psychological timetable to show the stages of the development of
his thought.

Undoubtedly the key which unlocked the puzzle of

theology for Luther was the concept of iustitia.

When he under-

stood it in a certain way, suddenly everything fell into place
and was clear for him. 8 He never doubted his theology again. No
5crotus Rubeanus, Luther's roommate at Erfurt wrote to
a friend that Luther was regarded as an "erudite philosopher" by
fellow students. Schwiebert, ~·cit., p. 133.
6The famous Tischreden, "Table-talk", written: for
posterity by friends accustomed to gather at Luther's table for
conversation after he had become a celebrity. Se a recent translation: Luther's Works, Table Talk, 54, ed. & tr. Theodore G.
Tappert, gen. ed. Helmut L. Lehmann, Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1967.
7The Opera Latina I, published in 1545.
8
Luther himself indicated that the key concept which
was unclear for many years was iustitia. He kept thinking of it
in terms of a condition of God which so far removes Him from
human unrighteousness that He cannot but punish them in His
wrath. When he conceived of it as also imputed to men by faith
so that they are saved by it, he, to use his words, "felt as
though 1 had been born again". The moment of insight, referred
to many times later by Luther, has been called the Turmerlebnis,
"Tower Discovery", since Luther was studying in his Tower office
at Wittenberg University when he had the experience. For an

•
8

less important philosophically for him must have been the concept
of liberum arbitrium.

His entire philosophic outlook flows from
/

this concept.

Given the free choosing of God, what follows about

everything else?

Until 1516 he

of human free choice.

a~cepted

the nominalist doctrine

After that he openly challenged its com-

patibility with divine freedom.

Augustine states in his

Confessions that though he could not for many years understand
God in any way except as material he never doubted that God
exists.

When he learned from the Platonists to think of God as

immaterial, then his intellectual difficulties began to dissipate. 9 Similarly Luther might have said that though he never
doubted that God acted freely he was not able to think of human
beings other than as freely acting.

W~en

however, he learned

from Augustine and St. Paul to think of human behavior as largely
determined by forces beyond man, then his philosophic (and for
that matter his theological) uncertainties began to dissipate.
Beyond a doubt the formative years after he had forsaken
the law school for the monastery were years during which first
his philosophic outlook changed and then his theological thought
crystalized.
years before.

The seeds for that crystalization were planted many
To them, then, we must first turn to understand

extended treatment of Luther's psychological struggle leading to
this experience see Schwiebert, 2£• cit., pp. 285-289, and
Mackinnon, QQ. cit., chapters IV and V; in particular chapter V,
section III.
9
Book 7, Chapter 20.
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Luther the Philosopher.
Luther's formal elementary and secondary training followed
/

the traditional basic liberal arts curriculum, the trivium of
grammar, rhetoric and logic. 10 It aimed at the assimilation and
sharpening of the use of the basic intellectual tool of the
middle ages, Latin.
Mansfeldt.

Luther attended first the Trivialschule at

On the primary level he studied the Latin primer,

together with religion and music for Sunday worship.

The middle

grade experiences centered on the Latin grammar of Donatus
together with extracts from Aesop, Cato and other classical
moralists, for the moral training of the young.

The upper level

focused on advanced grammar and syntax.
Luther received his secondary education in Magdeburg and
Eisenach.

The curriculum was divided into grammar, rhetoric and

logic, which in those days, involved the reading and writing of
poetry, the study and practice of composition and the
of discourse, particularly of argumentative discourse.
broadened his study of the Latin classics.

i~provement

He also

A portion of the

curriculum was devoted to improvement in spiritual exercises.
While in Liberal Arts studies at the University of Erfurt,
Luther made the acquaintance both of scholastic and humanistic
approaches to learning.

Like many another university at the

1
°For a discussion of the medieval educational system
and Luther's academic career, see Mackinnon, QE• cit., I,
chapter II, ii, "School and University Career."

,...
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time, in the midst of a variety of schools of thought boasting
their adherents in the faculty and student body, one school
/

tended to dominate.

At Erfurt the dominant approach was the

nominalist approach of Ockham and Biel.

It followed the

~

moderna and was open to the epistemological insights and psychological interests which, at least as far back as Grosseteste, had
marked the English approach to knowledge. 11

A lesser English

influence at Erfurt was exercised by Scotus. 12

Paris and Louvain

were represented on the faculty by certain persons still teaching
the via antigua, the traditional Aristotelian approach to knowledge.

Finally, the latest intellectual movement, humanism,

filtering up from Italy and given new momentum by persons like
Valla and Erasmus, also had its effect. 13

Judging by the time in

11 Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (c 1175-1253),
was interested in the application of mathematics to experience.
He with his disciple, Adam of Marsh, was one of the first
scientists in the modern tradition and an early precursor of
Newton. He was particularly interested in the study of perspective, contributing an early treatise on the properties of
light. His basic philosophic outlook is Platonic. The standard
Grosseteste biography is F. s. Stevenson, Robert Grosseteste,
Bishop of Lincoln (London 1899). A recent treatment is A. c.
Crombie's Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental
Science, (Oxford, 1953).
12 The Gabrielist nominalists at Erfurt tended to
identify the Scotists with the Thomists as both committed to- the
~ antigua.
Hence, even though Duns Scotus was the philosophical forebear of Biel through Ockham, the German nominalists
and scotists considered themselves as disciples of different
traditions. Of the three schools of thought at Erfurt, the
scotist group represented the smallest number on the faculty.
13 nuring the time Luther studied at Erfurt there was no
permanent faculty representing the humanistic outlook. Both
faculty and students were, however, a"1are of the movement,

11

residence of well known humanists a.t Erfurt, Luther was not subjected to much of their influence.

Yet, Luther's later career
/

and the effect which he had upon the curriculum offered at the
University of Wittenberg, shows that their influence on Luther
far outweighed the time they spent at Erfurt.

Yet, who is to sa .

Humanism.was the new darling of the students and the young intellectuals of northern Europe when Luther began to teach.
in the air.
its charm.

It was

Only the older, settled professors were immune to
Its primary appeal was to the young.

Be that as it may, Luther's undergraduate year and a half
was devoted to a study of Aristotelian grammar, rhetoric, logic,
physics and metaphysics.

He participated in the required exer-

cises and disputations which accompanied the lectures and was
active in the student club which met to discuss philosophy.
The baccalaureate was followed by a two-year masters program
involving tutoring the undergraduate students (a sort of graduate
assistanceship), studying advanced classes in Aristotle, plus
mathe~atics

and ethics.

The mathematical curriculum was divided

into the quadrivium of music, arithmetic, geometry and astronomy.
Luther studied, in addition to Aristotle (read in Latin), Cicero,
particularly as Erasmus became famous. By contrast with the
difficulty of content and aridity of style of all three scholastic schools, the clarity and richness of humanistic writings had
a natural appeal for students. And, of course, humanistic
iconoclasm was not lost on those young minds.

....
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Vergil, Livy and Plautus, among others, and read some scholastic
theology.

The awarding of the Master of Arts degree carried with
/

it the requirement of remaining for two years to teach at the
university.

With this in mind, Luther enrolled in the school of

Law at Erfurt to continue his studies while teaching, but three
months later suddenly entered the Augustinian monastery at
Erfurt. 14
At the conclusion of his novitiate, on instruction of his
order, he prepared for ordination to the priesthood by studying
Biel's Canon of the Mass.

Thus, he continued under the Ockhamite

influence even in the monastery.

Though an ordained priest, his

primary training was in liberal arts.

Three years after entering

the monastery, and a year and a half after entering the priesthood, Luther was transferred by his order to the young University
of Wittenberg to teach Aristotle's Nicomachaean Ethics.

The

Augustinian monastery at Wittenberg was closely related to the
University.

At the time of Luther's arrival it filled two

chair~

14He began the study of law in May of 1505. Having
completed his liberal education with the terminal master's degre~
Luther was beginning professional training in the field of law.
He suddenly entered the Augustinian monastery on the 17th of July,
1505. There has been much speculation about the "real" reas~>n·
for this sudden change. In the dedication to his father of his
work On Monastic Vows, 1521, he states that he was called to the
vocation by the terrors of heaven, and in fear of immanent death,
he swore an irrevocable vow. The reference is apparently to a
thunderstorm in which he was caught in the summer of 1505 when
lightning struck nearby. For a perceptive analysis of the problem see Mackinnon,~· cit., chapter II, section I.

'
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Biblical Theology, taught by the head of the order, John
staupitz, and Moral Philosophy, now taught by Luther/

Later, he

also taught Aristotle's Physics to the monks at Wittenberg.
While teaching at t</ittenberg; Luther began his theologica 1
studies to prepare himself to lecture on theology.

After six

months he received the Bachelor of Bible degree and began to
lecture on biblical exegesis as well as on ethics.

He began

studying the Book of Sentences in preparation for his examination
for the degree of Sententiarius.
six months later and

~Y'as

He passed the examination about

beginning to prepare for lecturing on

the Sentences when he was reassigned back to Erfurt to complete
requirements for the awarding of the degree.

The University of

Erfurt was understandably reluctant to comply on several counts:
their young Master a few years before had forsaken the classroom
for the monastery.

He had taken up studies elsewhere and com-

pleted a portion of his degree requirements there rather than at
Erfurt.

Wittenberg's requirements were much less stringent than

those of Erfurt.

However, the University finally complied.

Luther was next persuaded by Staupitz to study for the
Doctor of Divinity Degree, no doubt with the thought in mind that
Luther should replace Staupitz at Wittenberg.

Luther began, for

the first time, a serious study of Augustine.

Upon the reception

of the doctorate Luther returned to Wittenberg as professor of
Biblical Theology.
For better than a century the battle of the via moderna

jP -----------------------------------------------------------,
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against the via antigua had been raging in the universities of
Europe.

In recent years the new voice of humanism, particularly
/

.

Biblical humanism, had been raised against both ways..
voice, the via antigua, the

logic~l

The oldest

tradition, had stoutly

opposed the rhetorical tradition of the

~

moderna.

Now human-

ism, espousing a grammatical tradition, opposed both.
gave little evidence of which direction he would go.

Luther
For all

practical purposes he seemed to share the rhetorical approach of
the Ockhamites.

Yet within four years he rejected nominalism as

an approach to theology and influenced the change of the currieulum away from Aristotle to a more humanistic approach.
Frederick the Wise, Elector of Saxony, had founded
Wittenberg University in 1502.

It was.six years old when Luther

taught ethics there, and ten when he returned as Professor of
Theology.
lastic.

At its inception the university was thoroughly schoThe largest segment of the faculty, led by Andreas

Carlstadt, was thomistic in outlook.

The second largest segment,

led by Nicolas Amsdorf, was scotist.

In 1507 Trutvetter was

imported from Erfurt to introduce the nominalist position.
The curriculum resembled that which Luther himself had
encountered at Erfurt, the trivium and quadrivium, based on
Aristotle in Latin translation.

The theological curriculum

centered around the study of the

~

of Sentences.

But by 1516,

largely due to Luther's influence, the old curriculum was gone.
The new curriculum was based on the study of languages, Greek,

p
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Hebrew, and classical and church Latin.

Advanced courses

offered studies in the great writings of antiquity, pagan and
/

Christian.

The theological curriculum centered on exegetical

Bible studies, based on Hebrew and Greek texts.

The new univer-

sity had developed a decidedly linguistic character.

The key to

successful university work was no longer logic, but rather
language.
The effect of the curriculum change on the education offered
by the university was more profound than is immediately apparent.
Of course the language faculty increased rapidly, bringing, among
others, the man who after Luther would be the university's
brightest star, Philip Melanchthon.
texts in a variety of languages.

The library began to gather

But these were the most obvious

changes.
Students and faculty, with the aid of the new languages were
now able to study primary source materials in the original
languages.

They were not limited to secondary sources or expli-

cated and expurgated Latin translations.

Whatever manuscripts

and books their library contained they could read.

More and more

critical editions of Latin and Greek classics were being printed
in Europe and the librarian began assiduously to gather in short
order a respectable library.

What formerly were known only by

name, the whole ancient world of the pagan philosophers and poets
and early Greek Church Fathers, were now available and could be
read.

It was possible now to compare original with Latin

,
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translation or with commentary to judge the accuracy and adequacy
of the interpretation.

In the process many time-honored
/

reputations fell.

The situation was somewhat similar to the

rediscovery of Aristotle in the 13th century when the new logic
(of Aristotle, ironically enough) replaced the old logic which
for centuries had passed for Aristotle's thought.

With the

appearance of Moerbecke's translations, and others, men like
Aquinas were freed to develop the full implications of

Aristotle~

thought, locked in a foreign tongue since before Augustine with
the exception of what was available in Boethius.

Now, at

Wittenberg, the Greek world of the ancient poets, dramatists and
philosophers was rapidly being unlocked as well as the Greek and
Hebrew world of the Bible.
With language emphasis, inevitably the shift took place in
basic methodology from syllogistic to semiotic considerations.
The art of the exegete took precedence over the art of_the
logician.

Subtleties of meaning replaced subtleties of argument

as the primary focus of class lectures.

The direction of the

university changed from the preservation and perpetuation of the
ancient tradition to the getting back to primitive meanings.

The

authorities began to lose their authority, some because it was
now apparent that they didn't know what they were talking about;
the rest because they were notso necessary as before to connect
the present with the ancient past.
the gap.

Greek and Hebrew now bridged

p
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What of Luther himself?
guish cause from effect.
times?

It is always difficult to distin-

To what extent is a man ajfected by his

To what extent do some elements of his time affect him

because they are compatible with what he is?
certainty say.

One cannot with

We shall hazard only a few remarks about his

basic philosophic outlook.

To what extent it was shaped by the

tradition of Ockham and by the humanists one can only guess.
The Ockham tradition, wed to Aristotle, was inevitably bound
to fail; for even with the greatest latitu9e of interpretation
Aristotle was not a nominalist.
becoming evident.

But the Ockham tradition, wed to Plato, had a

greater chance to survive.
tradition.

By Luther's time this was

Augustine falls in the Platonic

St. John, one of the two great scriptural influences

on Luther, has a philosophic outlook more compatible with Plato
than with Aristotle.

To a lesser extent the same is true of the

other great influence, St. Paul.

What all of these have in

common, nominalism, Augustine, St. John and St. Paul, is dialectic.

The basic· tool of Aristotle and Aquinas is syllogistic.

Dialectic is useful only in those disciplines where syllogistic
cannot be used: ethics and the establishment of first principles.
Understandably enough, then, Luther, as he reached his own
philosophic maturity and began to teach with less and less dependence on his own teachers, began to take exception to the trust
of the church in Aristotle: Aristotle is inconsistent with
Christian theology: his god is asleep, a cause which is ignorant
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of the world of man and effects it strictly as a final cause; the
unmoved movers in the metaphysics are incompatible with human
/

choice in the Ethics; Aristotle's system requires the eternality
of rna tter.
In 1516 Luther publically broke with the nominalist traclition over the role of grace in conversion and denied the capacity of the human will,

11

~

puris naturalibus", to act freely in

spiritual matters prior to conversion.

In 1517 he attacked all

of "scholastic theology", including the three old traditions,
Thomism, Scotism and Ockhamism.

He attacked nominalism in a set

of 97 theses which he offered to defend.

In 1518, at the Con-

ference of the Augustinian monasteries of northern Europe, he
offered his Heidelberg Theses as a program of educational reform
to replace Aristotelian nominalism.

These same ideas are

reflected in his 1524 treatise, A Letter to the German Nobility,
in his proposals for change in the educational system

~f

Germany.

For the most part Luther's philosophic development had taken
place in a generally Aristotelian setting.

For about two cen-

turies the philosophic outlook of Thomas Aquinas had been the
accepted outlook of the church.

It had proved fruitful in
-

resolving doctrinal and practical issues and had made possible
within the academic world the development of a unified body of
disciplines.

In central Europe by Luther's time the Ockham

variety of Aristotelianism had taken precedence over Thomism.
But Luther was at heart a Platonist.

He found in Augustine a

F
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compatibility he did not find in Aristotle.

From a philosophic

standpoint he was an idealist in a realistic intellectual enviro
/

ment.

One can, then, understand, on purely intellectual grounds,

why he found pragmatic accommodation to the economic necessities
of the operational church incompatible with what he felt was
right.

For a Platonic idealist, knowledge and practice are

.
ble. 15
1nsepara
In a second way his philosophic inclination was incompatible
with his age.

For his.age was dominated br the logical

traditio~

refined and crystalized into that gem of medieval methodology,
the scholastic method.

Luther was a rhetorician.

In this he

found himself in agreement with the nominalist tradition and
Augustine, but quite out of sympathy with the pure Aristotelians.
They hedged him in, were "logic choppers''; they inhibited the
free flow of ideas which dialectic fostered with its discursive
methods of distinction and combination.

To the extent.that the

nominalists were rhetorical logicians Luther felt companionable
to them.

To the extent that they sought to fit their logic to

the Aristotelian mold he rejected them and called them sophists.
It is no surprise that from a methodological standpoint
Luther felt at home with the great Church rhetoricians Augustine
and Ambrose, or, for that matter, with the greatest of the pagan
15
or, as Plato put it, "Knowledge is virtue." For
Aristotle, however, there is a distinction between the theoretic,
the practical and the productive. ·
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Latin rhetoricians, Cicero and Quintillian.

He had a natural

sympathy for the classical poets and the Weltanschauung of the
/

tragic Greek mind.

He gained an early reputation as preacher and

was an immediate and continuing success as a pamphleteer and
polemicist.

Most of his non-exegetical works are rhetorical:

polemics, exhortations, refutations, etc.

And when one examines

his exegetical works, the rhetorical impress is there again in
the obvious concern to make the meaning of the text lively and
vivid for the hearer and reader.

He was a great classroom

lecturer, attracting and exciting the young students with his
dynamic presentations.
Unlike the humanists with their concern for style and
polish, for the elegant phrase and the clever saying, Luther is
rough-hewn, often coarse. 16

He seldom rewrites a paragraph.

language is vivid and striking.

His

His is a language which is

primarily a spoken language and only derivatively written.

He is

not a logician, as he knew logicians.

The

He is unsystematic.

method he finds most compatible with his own philosophic inclinations is the method of common-places, Aristotle's Topics,
dialectical logic.

Yet he feels more at home in Aristotle's

Rhetoric than in his logic, although he is familiar with both.
His view of man is voluntaristic, the view of a rhetorician.
The Aristotelian view of man was rationalistic.
16L·k

Tradition saw

. . .1n h.1s d ay, h e was not a b ove
1 e many a po 1 em1c1st
an ea.':: thy image or express ion if it sui ted his fancy.
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man as a mind in the body of an animal.
huwan was intellect.

What "'as peculiarly

The passions belonged to the animal nature
.

/

and tended to intrude upon and disrupt the calm reasonable
operation of the
was Biel.

hun~n

organism.

Ockham was a voluntarist, as

This side of the nominalists Luther never forsook,

although he parted from them on the subject of human freedom.
For Luther, then, man is a will, a moving force, subject to
stimulus, moved by persuasion.

He is motivated to act and can be

carried avtay by impulse and caprice.

His rational capacities are

the tools of his will to discover means whereby the urgings of
the will can be satisfied.

His passions are the expressions of

his very nature and are both good and bad.
Luther does not see man as Aristotle, Aquinas and others see
him, an intellect whose highest function is speculation.

Man is

a calculating creature who follows his peculiar bents, moved this
way and that by what strikes his fancy.
spirit, active, passionate and vital.

He is restless, a moving
To be a man is to be

active and doing things in the world.
Finally, by philosophic bent at odds with the general
philosophic climate of his day, the methodology of his age, and
its accepted view of man, Luther's philosophic inclination is
oriented to change, to the real, the original, the primitive.
For this reason he was open to humanistic innovations, though not
a humanist.

In Platonic fashion he sees a universe in flux, but

as a rhetorical Platonist he finds change compatible to him.

In

jiP
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this, he is perhaps more Heraclitean than Platonic.
is dynamic.

His theology

He tends to focus upon the uniqueness of individuals
/

and their independences, not upon their commonalities and
dependencies.

Hence, for him what holds men together, Laws and

societies, are positivities, artificial conventions arrived at
for commonly accepted ends.

Every man is his own priest.

The

organized church with its ecclesiastical structure is a human
convention, not a divinely ordained way of carrying out the
function of God's men in the.world.

And if something better can

be found to do that task it ought properly to take the place of
that structure.
be abused.

The individual conscience is sacred and must not

Is it any wonder that the revolut"ionary forces

organizing the peasant rebellion saw in Luther in the early 1520
their intellectual leader?

He stands in sharp contrast to his

age in what he taught; and what he accomplished must be understood in the light of that contrast.

Because he stands in sharp

contrast, he is not the product of any of the forces of his
times, nor even the result of the accidental intersection of many
forces.

He is a new voice.

Four voices vied for attention when Luther came upon the
intellectual scene.

The oldest and most venerable of the tra-

ditional voices, Thomism, affected him the least; for it was of
all, the most incompatible with his philosophic inclinations and
the one least clearly and distinctly spoken to him.
The second voice from the via antigua, Scotism, was not

,
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altogether clear in his day.

Luther heard this Oxonian voice

echoing in Wittenberg when he came, if not before at Erfurt; but
/

.
17
he foun d 1t an uncerta i n vo1ce.
•

The third voice, again originally a British voice, but one
which spoke with the German tongue of the Gabrielites, Luther
heard during his formative undergraduate and graduate days, but
this voice of the via moderna, though it was in many ways compatible to his own outlook, he rejected because it resembled too
.
18
great 1y t h e f ormer vo1ces.
Finally, from the southern Italian renaissance there had
come a voice which found a sympathetic echo in the European lowlands, the voice of humanism, the echo of Erasmus.

It did not

espouse a particular worldview; it advocated an attitude and a
method.

Luther declined the attitude and incorporated the method

. h.1s own approac h • 19
1n

The method led him back to Augustine and

from Augustine to St. John and St. Paul.
From the west and Thomas' Paris, the north and Scotus'
Oxford, the surrounding German lands and Biel's T6bingen, from
1 Duns Scotus was not very well represented by the

Scotists there. They tended to be dominated by the Thomists.
18 rn its Aristotelian structure and its acceptance of
human free will, it was, for him, just another brand of Scholasticism.
19The attitude of confidence in mankind and his capacity to cope with life is diametrically opposed to Luther's
position. He did take, from the humanists, however, their method
of linguistic studies and their emphasis on primary sources as
the foundation for education.
·
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the south and north, Valla's Florence and Erasmus• Louvain, the
voices came.

There was no eastern voice, for to the ea.st lay the
/

lands oppressed by the "Turk".

The voices reverberated first at

Erfurt, then at Wittenberg for the young Luther.

When he raised

his own voice he spoke first from the Ockham-Biel tradition.

But

as his voice gathered confidence it moved apart from them to
utter a new sound.

What he proposed called the academic world

away from a tradition steeped in Aristotle to an older tradition
steeped in Augustine's Platonism.
call it Lutheranism.

If the voice needs a name,

.

That fifth voice and the philosophic impli-

cations of what it said constitute the remainder of this book.

p
CHAPTER II
LIBERUM ARBITRIUM--THE PROBLEM OF GOOD AND KVIL
The "free will problem" very likely dates as far back as
the first serious reflection on the nature of human action.

For

the conditions which--even today--compel us to re-examine our
previous explanations of how human beings act, tend often to be
the same conditions which raise the "free will problem" again.
It is a peculiar kind of problem.

First of all, it has

persisted with a strange tenacity throughout the entire history
of philosophic investigation, sometimes looming menacingly in the
forefront of the philosophic spectrum and commanding the attention of the best thinkers of an era; at other times lying in the
background relatively unimportant, lacking in philosophic vigor,
even though unre·solved--another of the chestnuts which philosophers are wont, upon occasion, to roll out and roast when they
have nothing better to do.

In this peculiarity, however, the

"free will problem" is not unique.

For other classical philo-

sophie problems have had similar careers.
Secondly, the "free will problem"--one hesitates to call it
"the" problem, since every time it arises it seems to assume a
different form--unlike most philosophic problems, is interdisciplinary, arising from a discontinuity between the implications
for human action of two or more intellectual disciplines as one
or the other develops.

One of the disciplines is invariably

F
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ethics or psychology.

The resolution of the "free will problem"

then, whether recognized or not, involves an

effor~

somehow to

harmonize the two conflicting disciplines with one another.
The source of the problem, to some extent, lies in the
varying natures of the theoretic and the practical disciplines.
Practical sciences require freedom in some fashion or other as a
condition for action.

Consequently, it is to their interest to

preserve within the theoretic sciences an area of chance, uncertainty, unpredictability, unexplainability--call it what you
will--which will leave room for decision making.
On the other hand, theoretic sciences naturally aim at
developing a closed system of explanation, admitting no exceptions, in order by means of it to describe and to predict.
Randomness in any sector of the system limits its predictive
adequacy and accuracy.

From a temporal standpoint a theoretic

science tends to require a closed future (or none at
a practical science requires

a~l)

while

an open future.

When, then, a scientific theory which represents an advance
over previous theories in closing the future and limiting the
area of unpredictability, begins to achieve acceptance, it undercuts the foundations on which the practical sciences of the time
are based.

The "free will problem" emerges as an inter-dis-

ciplinary discontinuity.
Because the "free will problem" involves interdisciplinary
considerations, one must somehow deal with it working with a
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"foot in each discipline"; or, since the problem must be solved
in an interdisciplinary way--each discipline

stout~

resisting

change in its own formulations--if possible, some neutral ground
of common meeting must be found wherein the problem can be
interpreted and, if possible, resolved.

Such a common ground has

usually been wholly, or in part, philosophical.

For, belonging

properly in no single discipline, since it is interdisciplinary
in character, and defying resolution, the problem naturally comes
sooner or later to the attention of the thinker

who deals with

such problems, the philosopher.
Luther's "free will problem" in its initia 1 form involves
purely theological considerations.

For Luther it is the class-

ical question of the cause of conversion, a question which exercised the Christian church even before Augustine and was still
debated at Luther's time.

1

Is conversion the result of human

1The question of conversion involves the "free will
problem", for it is concerned with whether or not there is any
human choice in the act of conversion. Augustine arguing that
conversion is a divine act, opposed the doctrine of Pelagius, a
British monk, that the conversion from opposition to God to faith
in God is an act of human choice. The Pelagian view was condemned at the Council of Ephesus in 431. A few years later
another group attempted to find a middle ground ben1een Augustine
and Pelagi.us, semi-pelagianism, explaining conversion as a
combination of human activity and divine grace. This sort of
approach tended to persist through the middle ages.
It was
opposed by John Wycliff (1320-1384) and John Hus (1369-1415)
before Luther. Luther in his debate with John Eck at Leipzig
defended Hus on this doctrine and defended Wycliff inter alios
in his argument with Erasmus.
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choice, of divine decision, or of joint divine-human activity?
In order to answer these questions one must

previo~ly

arrive at

conclusions about states of affairs which fall outside the discipline of theology.

The answers to these sorts of questions

involve interdisciplinary considerations.

Decisions have to be

made concerning the nature of human choice, the scope and limits
of choice, the limits of human responsibility, the possibility of
independent human activity, the nature of willing, etc.,

questio~

involving, at a minimum, psychology and ethics.
Since, then, the theological question has existential
signigicance, if the theological answer which is given denies the
existential capacity to act, the free will question both arises
and becomes a vital issue.

For the theological answer intrudes

upon and apparently contradicts some of the basic presuppositions
necessary for a viable ethic, human freedom and responsibility.
Luther argues on theological grounds for an absence of human
activity in conversion.

He is concerned at all costs to preserve

the complete freedom of God to act.

As a result, he must in some

way reconcile that divine freedom with the minimal conditions for
a human ethic.

Otherwise his theology has no existential value.

A theology which lacks existential implication for a practical
ethic, lacks the reason or the substance for survival; and, since
it lacks existential implications, it cannot but either turn back
upon itself as a curious but wholly irrelevant creation of human
thought which may be analyzed and enjoyed in fashion as a painting
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or a game or a pure mathematical construct are enjoyed; or be
taken seriously, frustrate the development of an

e~ic

-and hang

over the civilization it dominates like a deadly miasma, suffoeating all its efforts to act.

Neither condition is tolerable.

Luther himself saw his problem as somewhat the reverse of
that we have just described, for he seems to have feared that the
development of an ethic of human freedom would come into conflict
with and suppress the vitality of any theology which purported
to have existential significance and involvement.

If God enters

into our experience and has anything to do with it, then there
must be a role for God to play.
spectator or a slave.

He cannot simply be an idea, a

If God is not fully God, then He is

unnecessary.
This concern of Luther's about the relative relationships
of the divine and the human in human action is surprisingly
modern.

One needs go no further back in philosophic history

. . . 1 concern. 2
t h an Sartre to note t h e same 1.n1.t1:a

with the same postulate.

For both begin

If God exists, then man is not free.

They differ in the minor premise they accept; and, as a result,
the conclusion each reaches is radically different.

For Sartre,

2 Note in particular chapter Two of Part IV, Being and
Nothingness, entitled "Existential Psychoanalysis", New York:
Philosophical Library, 1956, pp. 566-568. This chapter is also
published separately by Philosophical Library under the title
Existential Psychoanalysis. The question of divine versus human
freedom is also examined in the early paragraphs of Sartre's
Essay, "Existentialism is a Humanism."
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existential human freedom is a prime fact of existence, perhaps
the only prime fact.

Its facticity militates

logical significance for God.

agai~t

any onto-

Therefore, God does not exist.

Luther, on the other hand, finds freedom ontologically necessary.
But ontological freedom is a characteristic of which only God is
capable.

Thus, human freedom is a chimera.

Somehow or other a metaphysical doctrine must make existential sense.

A doctrine such as human unfreedom is particularly

difficult to interpret in a manner which results in existential
consequences that jibe with our everyday experience.

One can

always argue that our naive experience is mistaken and thereby
solve the problem.

This is the easy way.

It is, however, one

thing to argue for the mistakenness of our experience; but
another task--unfortunately one seldom undertaken--to explain then
why it is that naive experience maintains such a persistent hold
on our credibility.
The much more difficult alternative is to attempt to resolve
the metaphysical problem of human unfreedom in a way which is
consistent with our naive experience.

Luther's is one of the few

efforts to attempt such a resolution.
ONTOLOGICAL DETERHINISM3
According to Luther the expression liberum arbitrium is
3

one must carefully distinguish three different levels
of thought in Luther's conception of liberum arbitrium. He
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significant in its fullest sense only on the ontological level
where it refers to the activity of the divine \-Till/creating and
preserving the being of the objects of its intent.

"It is a

divine name and signifies a divine strength (virtus). 114
Definition
Luther nowhere explicity in an organized fashion examines
what is meant by "freely choosing".

Perhaps, since the expres-

sion essentially characterizes an activity of which God alone is
capable 5 it is beyond definition. Luther does at one place offer
a description of liberum arbitrium which he attributes to popular
thought: "a force (vis) which is able freely (libere) to turn
itself to anything whatsoever, and such a force would not yield
6
or submit itself to any."
himself does not make the distinction--although he consistently
observes them--nor does he identify them by names. For purposes
of clarity I have labeled then: the ontological level, the
manichaean level and the existential level. More neutral expressions like level 1, 2 and 3 or X, Y and Z might have been used,
but these were chosen because each has some descriptive significance for the level it identifies and has the further value of
relating these three aspects of Luther's thought to their historical antecedents and descendents in other philosophical systems.
The first level ontologically is prior to the other two. The
second is temporally as well as ontologically prior to the third.
4wA XVIII, p. 664.
5 Ibid., p. 662.
6
Ibid., p. 637. The description as a definition contains a slight inelegance since liberum is defined in part by
libere. What Luther perhaps had in mind by the term "libere" is
"facilly, without limitation". If this phrase is substituted for
the expression in the description, the apparent circularity is
removed.
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The description contains three characteristics: liberum
arbitrium is 1) a power {vis), 2) of

self-turning~

anything

whatsoever, and 3) unyielding and superior to anything else.

The

study of liberum arbitrium, then, is the study of the activity of
God, His energy, His dynamic.

The activity is self-energized.

The power is under the direction of God and can be directed by
God to move Himself to anything whatsoever.
be moved or overpowered by another being.

God cannot, however,
He has active and

middle capacities but not passivity.
Characteristics
Scattered throughout De Servo Arbitrio are passages containing or hinting at other characteristics of liberum arbitrium or
of a will possessed of this capacity.

There is a sort of loose

logic which relates these characteristics to one another, some
of which Luther indicates.

We shall attempt to supply that which

he omits.
Predetermination
Speaking on the topic of divine foresight and the doctrine
of predestination, Luther says that if God did not have elective
ability "what would He be but chance under whose influence everything would be random happening. 117 The exercise of liberum
arbitrium, obviously, is the opposite of chance as a principle of
explanation of what happens.
7

Ibid., p. 706.

Some of the typical characteristics
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of a chance

situaJQX~trf~4t~!~J\#ontaneity,

occurrence, uncontrolled

motio~etc.

accidential

Opposed to th}s is activity

which is organized, considered, deliberate, purposeful, effective,
etc.

Because Luther replaces the traditional opposition of

freedom and determinism by the opposition of freedom and chance,
predetermination is entailed by freedom as a necessary condition.
The exclusion of chance requires that an entity possessing
liberum arbitrium not only have the capacity to examine all
possible options and to act on any alternative, but also that it
successfully complete its options 9 and that nothing unexpected
occur.

What it predetermines and only what it predetermines must

occu~otherwise

it is not free.

Omnipotence
The capacity to exercise any option, entailed also by
liberum arbitrium, is more familiarly identifiable by the expression "omnipotence".

Luther defines it as:

not the potency (potentiam) by which He (God) does
not make many things He has the capacity to make, but
that actuality, by which He powerfully makes everything, in that sense that Scripture calls Him omnipotent.8
For choice to be possible there must be options other than
that actually made.
exercises.

God has ·alternatives other than those He

They are possible because He thinks them, for He

creates their possibility by thinking them.
8

Ibid., p. 718.

Otherwise, they
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would have no being.

But when He acts, no actions other than

those God performs are possible for His action exclydes their
existence.

He creates all that can be.

From an ontological

standpoint, then, everything is done by God.

This is what is

meant by omnipotence, 11 doing everything 11 , not, as in the schola stic sense Luther opposed, 11 capa ble of doing anything 11 •
from the ontological action of God there is no action.
it all.

Apart

He does

Since God is impassive no state of affairs can be

explained or accounted for on the grounds of divine permissiveness or toleration. God knows everything and does everything. 9
Necessity
11 If God foreknows, the thing happens necessarily •••

neither errs nor makes mistakes. 1110

•

God

Necessity of which Luther

9
since nothing is independent of God, nothing is
possible unless God causes it to be possible, at a minimum, by
thinking of it. Whatever at one time or another is humanly conceived as possible comprises but a portion of divine possibility.
There is another body of possibles which, from a human standpoint
are inconceivable since they do not fall within the scope of
reality of which humanity is a part. At the same time these
latter possibles are conceivable for God by virtue of the sheer
fact that He does conceive them even though He gives them no
being in any other form than His thought. The ontological level
of reality as Luther conceives it embraces the entire activity of
God acting freely--to an infinitesmal portion of which we with
our limited intelligence are privy. The major portion is hidden.
Whence Luther speaks of this as Deus absconditus, the hidden side
of God. It may well be that because we are privy to only a
portion we think experience is contingent, whereas if we knew the
rationale of the whole we would recognize and understand how it
is a completely predetermined pattern of events.
10
WA XVIII, p. 717.
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speaks holds for the relation between the will of God and the
event, not for God Himself.

The capacity perfectl'ito preplan,

eliminates the possibility of error.
Unchangeability
There is a sort of necessity which holds for the divine wil
the necessity of changelessness.
I \o~ould wish that there could be given a better
word • • • than the usua 1 term "necess i ty 11 , which is
not rightly used either in describing the divine or
the human will. For it is much too graceless and
incongruous in signification for this topic, as
though there were a sort of compulsion, something
going against the will, forcing the mind • • • •
For the will, be it divine or human, does freely
what it does under no coercion as it wants or
pleases, whether good or bad; yet, however, the
will of God which governs our changeable will is
changeless and infallible, as Boethius sings:
"Stable and permanent, you give movement to alt."ll
Infallibility
Fallibility is possible when an agent's power exceeds his
understanding or his knowledge, his capacity, or when both are
equal to the other, but limited.

Since God is not limited in any

way He cannot fail.
Would you believe that God unwillingly foresees what
will happen or expresses His will ignorantly? If He
foresees events willingly His will is eternal and
immovable (such is His nature) and if He expresses
His will with foresight, His knmo1ledge is eternal and
immovable (such is His nature). From which it follows
irrefragably that all which we do, all things that
happen, although they seem mutable to us are in
11 Ibid., p. 616, footnote 1.
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accordance with the will of God. For the will of
God is effective and cannot be impeded since power
is the very nature of God; indeed His wisdom ifi
such that He cannot be impeded, but is done irl
the place, time, manner and amount that He Himself
both foresees and wills.12
Foresight and omnipotence, i.e., perfect planning and execution
are, thus, entailed by liberum arbitrium.
Eternality
"••• God foreknows nothing contingently, but both foresees,
proposes and does everything by His unchanging, eternal and
infallible will. 1113
from the other.

These three characteristics follow, the one

A will with the capacity of liberum arbitrium,

lacking the capacity to err and superior to any other will is of
necessity infallible in its choice.

If it is infallible then it

is also unchanging; for there is no reason for it to change.
Since, then, it expresses itself infallibly and unchangingly, the
will persists, i.e., is eternal, there being nothin·g which can
inten:.upt it.
Primacy
If the will of God is free, it follows that God is prior to
any rule or standard.

He is the primal being.

Luther describes

God in such fashion:
God is He for Whose will there is no cause (caussa
[sic]) or rationale (ratio) which prescribes for Him
12 Ibid., pp. 615, 616.
13
~., p. 615.
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any sort of rule (regula)or measurement (mensura),
since there is nothing equal or superior to Him, but
rather He Himself is the rule for everything. For
if there would be any rule or measurement or iause
or rationale for His will it could no longer be the
will of God. For it is not because He ought or is
bound to will in such a fashion that He wills as He
does. On the contrary, it is because He Himself wills
it in such a fashion that what does happen is obliged
to be right. The cause and the rationale of the
creature's will are prescribed, but not that of the
Creator- unless you would put another creator over
. 14
H:un.
Of course, to posit a creator for the Creator would
unnecessary and would lead to an infinite

~egress.

~e

As primal

entity, then, God is not bound by rules and values but is rather
their source.

Because He is not bound by any rules, He is not

accountable for His actions.

He brings into being whatever He

wills.
God in His own nature and majesty, then, is all by
Himself and, in this respect, we have nothing to do
with Him, nor is He interested in having us deal with
Him. We deal with Him clothed and revealed in His
Word, by means of which He presents Himself to us.
••• • And He has not set limits for Himself by His
Word, but keeps Himself free over all things.15
In conclusion, if the various characteristics which make up
the notion of liberum arbitrium are gathered together, Luther's
conception is that of a primal ontological entity possessed of
14 Ibid., p. 712. Note also: "Natural reason
to confess that the living and true God must be one if
liberty He imposes necessity on us. ••• • He-wQuld
ulous if He could not and did not do everything or if,
Him, anything were done." Ibid., p. 718.
15 Ibid., p. 685.

is forced
by His own
be ridicapart from
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the capacity to act without limitation either by itself or
others.

It acts, with complete consciousness, knowJedge and

power, bringing into being and preserving in its being whatever
is, achieving its own satisfaction.

It is eternal, immutable,

infallible, irresistible and changeless.
is the expression of this power.

Whatever else there is

It is superior to all else for

if there were its equal or superior it would be limited by the
other.

Man cannot possess liberum arbitrium; for his capacities

are inferior to its characteristics.

EverY.thing happens neces-

sarily according to the divine will for it is the necessary and
sufficient reason for all things.
For all men find this proposition written in their
hearts and recognize it and agree (albeit unwillingly)
when they hear it propounded. First: that God is
omnipotent, not only in potency, but also in act,
(as I have said); were it not so God would be ridiculous. Secondly: that He Himself knows and plans all
things, neither being able to make a mistake or to
fail. These two propositions being conceded by all
hearts and senses, all are compelled to admit by
inevitable consequences: we are not made by our own
will but by necessity; thus we do not make whatsoever we make by the right of free choice, but instead
God plans out and acts with an infallible and unchanging counsel and power. Whence, at the same time,
men find written in all their hearts: there is no
such thing as a (human) free choice. Granted that
it is much obscured by so much disputing to the contrary and by the great authoritl of men through the
ages who have taught otherwise. 6

16 rbid., p. 719. Pagan sources to \o~hich Luther refers

in support of his contention for a natural knowledge of divine
omnipotence and determinism are Virgil, Horace, Roman and Greek
mythology, all of which make reference to fate and predestinatio~
pp. 617-618.
.

~
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THE MANICHAEAN DIALECTIC
Satanic Defection

/

Thus far our analysis of Luther's philosophy has concerned
itself with one pole of a bipolar, that is dialectical, view of
reality, the activity of God, accounting for perfection, order,
metaphysical goodness, unity, etc.

The problem at this point is

the possibility that he has so polarized his approach at one
extreme of the philosophic spectrum that he will be unable to
account for the opposite extreme: imperfection, disorder, evil,
disunity, etc.

He posits a God completely free.

The danger is

that this complete freedom will make any other freedom

impossibl~

If all of reality is reducible to divine ontological activity, it
may imply the impossibility of

h~an

practical activity.

If it

does, it will come into contradiction with the facts of everyday
experience as we know them.
A universe which is the product of liberum arbitrium will
function orderly and efficiently.

All will be perfect initially

and consistently fulfill its appointed function in accordance
with the preplanned program laid down by God.

Such a universe,

however, perfect as it may be, contains no contingency, defi·ciency, error or evil.

Yet, we think we find all of these

characteristics in our everyday experience.

Luther is unwilling

to claim that we are mistaken about our experience.

How can they

occur in a universe, the operation of which follows by strict
necessity from the activity of a perfectly free being?

To resolve
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this problem we must shift from the ontological to the manichaean
level of meaning. 17
/

Luther provides scanty help to account for the manner in
which evil originated.

The cause is identified as Satan who
first fell from grace, then tempted man to fa11. 18 How is such

a fall possible?

Luther gives no answer.

of Christian belief.

The doctrine is a part

We can, however, suggest a philosophic

answer consistent with what has already been established as
Luther's position and supported by one comment of Luther.

To be

of philosophic value, rather than of merely historic or theological interest, let us pose the question in the most general
terms and apply the answer to the particular case.

How is evil

possible in a universe created by an entity possessing liberum
1 I call it the manichaean level because it is the
level of opposition of super-human forces of good and evil,
accounting for the origin of evil in the world, traditionally
associated with the teachings of Mani; and because this level of
explanation, as found in Augustine and in Luther was mistakenly
attacked as Manichaean by their opponents. In historic Manichaeanism there are at least two basic differences: 1) the forces
are of roughly equal pm.;rer and of equal majesty and 2) this
level is primary in Hanichaeanism, not secondary as in Augustine
and Luther.
1811 It is uncertain on what day the fall of the angels
occurred, whether on the second or on the third [day of creationl
Only this much can be shown from the gospel, that Satan fell from
heaven, inasmuch as Christ declares that He saw him fall from
heaven. [Luke 10:18) 11 Luther's Works, I, Lectures .Q!! Genesis,
Chapters 1-5. tr. George V. Schick, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, St.
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1958, p. 150. Bracketed
rna teria 1 mine.
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arbitrium?
Evil is possible where there are thinking entities which can
/

be moved and where two or more possible objects exist toward
which or against which such entities can be moved.

Under such

conditions motivations can shift from their proper objects to
improper objects.

Such entities can think of what is not the

case and want it to be the case.

Since, in a universe where what

is the case is produced by liberum arbitrium, what is the case is
what ought to be the case for entities in that universe.

To

desire what is not the case is to desire what ought not to be to
exist.

This is the essence of evil.

Luther's position presupposes the existence of at least one
created entity, Satan, having the opportunity (both God and it
existed as possible objects of its affection) and the capacity
(it could feel affection for either) of changing the object of
its motivation.

It moved itself away from its proper end, God,

to a lesser end, itself, and thereby became deficient in its
future operation: it acted as though it were God.
There exists in Luther's writings only one attempt to
describe Satan's fall.

It is found in a sermon preached in

Wittenberg on Monday of Easter week, April 2, 1526.
For this reason Satan lost his godlike power, in that
because of the Son [of God] he was thrown out of
heaven to the outer reaches of Hell, Is. 14:12, Luke
10:18, because Satan stood beneath the Son in honor,
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but wanted to be like Him.
tolerate .19-

This God could not

With the notion of a satanic entity, there is/now posited in
Luther's thought a second, a destructive principle of action,
counterposed to the original creative principle, God.

It is a

principle preserved in its being by the original principle, and
superior to human power, constantly perverting the nature of
whatever it can contro1. 20
19Luther 1 s SMrnmtliche Schriften,"III, General editor,
John George Walch, editor, A. F. Hoppe, St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1894, p. 659. Underlining mine.
20 In several passages Luther vividly describes the
nature, attitude and actions of this satanic power. "••• in whom
there is even greater enmity against God, greater hatred and
fury, than in man, in spite of the fact that he was .not created
evil but had a will in conformity with the will of God. This
will he has lost; he has also lost his very beautiful and very
excellent intellect and has been turned into an awful spirit
which rages against his Creator. 11 Luther's Works, .22• cit.,
p. 143. It will become apparent that for Luther, to become
defective, an entity must not only be affected volitionally, but
also intellectually. It becomes both perverse and stupid. To
borrow an image from physics, its motion becomes eccentric. An
entity becomes increasingly deficient as it continues its wayward
way. If only its volitional faculties were affected it would be
obstinate and might be increasingly stubborn in persisting in its
mistake, but this would be simply a matter of degree or intensit~
If, however, the rational capacity is also affected, then, it
becomes incapable of knowing that it is in error and is capable
of more grievous delusions. "••• the devil everlastingly hates,
accuses and damns God but exonerates himself; and it is not
possible for him to say from his heart: 1 Lord, I have sinned,
forgive me.'" Ibid., p. 179. "••• just as he lacks the promise
of grace, so he cannot put an end to his transgressions, blasphemies and hatred of God." Ibid., p. 180. These latter two
quotations exhibit the permanence of the Satanic personality.
Since it is incapable of renovation, it is a persistent principle
of destruction. "If it were not for the Son of God Satan would
put an end to every living thing and choke it off from existence."
Ibid., p. 189. It robs existents of their being.
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Satanic Domination: The Human Predicament
Luther accounts for the origin of human evil differently
/

than for the origin of evil itself.

Whereas evil originated in a

perfect universe because of the turning_of a created will from
its proper object to itself, human evil arose from the limitedness of human knowledge and a temptation which capitalized on
that limitation.
In his commentary on Genesis, Luther says that the command
of God not to eat of the tree of good and evil surpassed Adam's
power to understand.

Nothing in his experience singled that tree

out as different or dangerous.
simply because God had given it.

He had to believe the command
He had to take it on faith.

This, then, gave Satan his opportunity to call into question
thing man could not possibly examine, the will of God.

som~

Satan

could create doubt and thereby distrust of the divine command. 21
In the human case, as contrasted with the case of Satan, the
fall was occasioned, not by a self-engendered change of motivation, but by external motivation, for man can be motivated; he
.
h.~mse lf • 22
cannot mot~vate
21
Luther's Works, QE• cit., p. 154. It is interesting
to note, then, that Luther suggests that limited human intelligence provided the opportunity for evil. This could not have
been the cause of the fall of Satan, since, as the foremost of
the angels, he was always in the presence of God.
22 Luther never wrote a treatise on human psychology.
Some insight into his thinking, however, can be afforded by
examining what Melanchthon, his associate, said in the Loci
Communes of 1521, a little book highly praised and completely
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Since man does not determine his motivations, he is susceptible to persuasion.

Luther interprets the fall of man as
/

a deliberate misleading of the will of man by an unscrupulous
Sa tan.
Luther upon occasion talks about the "liberum arbitrium"
of original man, lost in the fall from grace.

He interprets the

expression differently, however, than he does when applying it
strictly to God.

The expression is contrasted with servum

approved of by Luther. "••• in giving a description of the
nature of man, I shall have no need of the many divisions employed by the philosophers, but shall use only a few. In fact,
man is divided into two parts only. For in man are the faculty
of cognition (vis cognoscendi) and the faculty by which he either
follows up or shuns those things which he has learned. The
faculty of cognition is that by which we perceive or understand;
by which we reason and mutually compare things and deduce conclusions, one after the other. The second part, or the faculty
from which the affections take origin, is that by which we either
resist or follow after the things known. This faculty is sometimes denominated will (voluntas), sometimes affection (affectlliW,
sometimes appetite (appetitum) ." The Loci Communes of Philip
Melanchthon, tr. Charles Leander Hill, Boston: Heador Publishing
Company, 1944, p. 71. "••• internal affections are not within
our power. For by experience and practice we have found out that
the will of its ov.m accord cannot assume love, hate, or the like
affection; but that one affection is conquered by another ••• •
But what is the will if not the fountain of the affections."
Ibid., p. 76. "If you refer the will to the affections [as
opposed to actions], even from the point of view of natural judgment there is plainly no liberty. Now when an affection has
begun to rage and to burn, it cannot be restrained from bursting
forth." Ibid., p. 81.
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arbitrium, an idea

.
wh~ch

23
h e got f rom August~ne.
.

The contrast

is not between freedom and chance--the ontological 7ontrast,
but between freedom and bondage--the manichaean contrast.
dom is defined as obedience to God.

Free-

Inability to obey God, then,

is bondage, the inability to perform the functions prescribed by
divine will.

The fall of man rendered him incapable of free

service to God, for both his cognitive and volitional faculties
became defective.
"Free will after the fall of Adam (or.after the commission of
sin), is an empty name; when he

[rr~n]

does things for himself, he

sins to the dea th. 1124
Now Satan and man, being fallen and abandoned by
God, cannot will good (that is, things that please
God, or that God wills), but are ever turned in
the direction of their own desires, so that they
cannot but seek their own. This will and nature
of theirs, thus turned from God, cannot be nothing,
nor are Satan and ungodly man nothing; nor have they
a nature and will that is nothing, though they certainly have a nature that is corrupt and turned
from God. So that which we call the remnant of
nature in the ungodly and in Satan, as being a
23 rn Article 36 of his pamplet "Wider die Bulle des
Endchrists", Latin title "Assertio omnium articulorum M. Lutheri,
per bullam Leonis, X. novissima damna torum. 11 , written in response
to the bull of excommunication in November, 1520, Luther quotes
Augustine "contra Jul. book 2 11 as calling the "free will" of man
servum arbitrium, because it is enslaved to Satan. This treatise
served as the basis for Erasmus' attack upon Luther in his
Diatribe. Luther responded with the treatise De Servo Arbitrio.
Luther's SHmmtliche Schriften, XV, p. 1560.
24
1£1Q., p. 1559

,....-.
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creature and a work of God, is no less subject
to Divine omnipotence and action than all the
rest of God's creatures and works. Since God
moves and works all in all, He moves and worki
of necessity even in Satan and the ungodly.
But He works according to what they are and
what He finds them to be: which means, since
they are evil and perverted themselves, that
though they are impelled to action by this
movement of Divine omnipotence they do only
that which is perverted and evil.2)
The perversion of human nature, then, as indicated by Luther
in this passage, involves a shifting of orientation of the entire
personality from God-centeredness to self-centeredness.

[We have

already noted in Luther's interpretation of the fall of Satan the
shift from God-centeredness to Satan himself as god.

In a sense,

on the human level Luther interprets the fall of man in essence
as the same shift.]

Eve set herself a.bove the command of God.

She made herself to be the judge of God, imposing her standards
on Him.
If a human being is self-centered, there is no way whereby
he can by his own effort escape continuing to be self-centered,
for every act is an expression of self-centeredness.

He is born

that way and lives that way because he is not able to be anything
other than what he is.

His appropriate nature is to respond to

the will of God, to be responsive to the activity of God.

Since

he cannot at the same time respond to God and to himself and,
since all his actions are self-centered, he lives in continual
25HA XVIII, p. 709.
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opposition to God.

26

Luther refers to this bondage of self-involvement as the
/

11

necess i ty of immutability".
This is what we mean by necessity of immutability:
that the will cannot change itself, nor give itself another bent, but, rather, is the more provoked to crave the more it is opposed, as its
chafing proves; for this would not occur, were
it free or had liberum arbitrium.27
Thus, one of the aspects of the human predicament is that it

11 ~

mutare

.!!.Qn

possit 11 , is not able to change itself.

Perhaps

even more devastating is a second aspect of this "necessity of
immutability".
26Luther, for instance, quotes Augustine in The Spirit
and the Letter to the effect that "free will" without grace is
worth nothing except to sin. Luther's SHmmtliche Schriften, XV,
p. 1559. If man is turned from God, whether he knows it or not,
he is under the domination of Satan. Apparently, what Luther
also wants to argue is that the human being does not simply pay
the consequences of his perversion by continuing to be what he
is, but he becomes progressively worse. Luther dramatically
declaims in a sermon: "Satan is the hellish rider, of \olhom the
poets have spoken, who rides the poor soul and mind as his horse,
and guides them wherever he wants, from one sin to another."
Luther's SHmmtliche Schriften, XII, Sermon "Von den Besessenen" on
Matt. 8:28-34, pp. 1562-1563. This sermon was delivered sometime
in the year 1537. Luther is lamenting the plight of the man who
wants to be a good man, but in his inability to be good becomes
progressively tormented and tortured in soul and confused in mind
at the disparity between his ethical standards and his actions.
Luther concludes, "Where is then free will, a thing which is the
prisoner of Satan. It isn't anything because it doesn't do anything, but rather does everything according to the devil' s will."
Luther's S~mmtliche Schriften, XV, pp. 1559-1560.
27WA XVIII, p. 634.
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I said, "of necessity"; I did not say "of compulsion"; I meant, by a necessity , not of compulsion,
but of what they call immutability. That is to
say; ~ !!:'2.!} without the Spirit .Qi God does .!!Q.! -do
evil against his will, under pressure, as though
he were taken by the scruff of the neck and dragged
off against his will to puni~hmgnt; but he~ 1!
spontaneously ~ voluntarily.2
Luther concludes, that since human beings are both unwilling
and unable to be anything other than what they are, therefore,
••• liberum arbitrium is an empty term whose
reality is lost. A lost freedom, to my way of
speaking, is no freedom at a 11, and to give the
name freedom to something that has no freedom i~ .
to apply to it a term that is empty of meaning. 9
We, thus, have encountered, in a second sense, the notion
of human liberum arbitrium as an empty term.

For, if the human

will is not able to will to be what it as a will ought to be, it
is not free.

It has no choice.

be different than it is.

It cannot and does not will to

Hence, 1)because the omnipotence of God

28
Idem. Underlining mine. Note also Luther's comment:
"Scripture i'i1'deed sets forth man in such fashion that he not only
is bound, miserable, confined, sick and dead, but he adds to his
other miseries, through the operation of his ruler Satan, this
misery of blindness: he believes that he is free, blessed, whole,
powerful, healthy and alive. For if man were to know his miserable condition, Satan knows that he could not keep him in his
rule. God could not fail to pity and to help misery which knew
itself and cried out for help for He is proclaimed through all of
scripture with great praise as being near those of contrite
heart, ••• • Hence, the task of Satan is to maintain such a hoM
on men that they never recognize their misery, but assume that
they can do all things which they are claimed [to be able to do].
WA XVIII, p. 679.
29
Luther 1 s snmmtliche Schriften, XV, p. 1561.
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is the sole and sufficient explanation of all that is, human
beings cannot effectively will themselves to be, to continue to
.

/

be or to cease to be and, 2) because of satanic domination, they
cannot and do not will their wills to be different than they are.
Divine Counter-Action
Such a state of affairs, of course, God could not ignore,
for, to permit it to continue unchecked would have resulted in
the frustration of creative activity and the passing from
existence of all that is.

Divine omnipotence would be manipu-

lated by the satanic powers to bring about the destruction of the
divine creation, for the omnipotence of God, as primary principle
of all that is, maintains the existence of Satan.

Such moving

of the divine nature into opposition to itself is ontologically
impossible.
The opposite extreme to complete permissiveness is to remove
this destructive power from existence.

In discussing the

question why evil actions occur when God is all powerful, Luther
comments,
God cannot suspend His omnipotence on account of
man's perversion, ••• • In all this Satan continues to reign in peace; under this movement of
Divine omnipotence he keeps his palace undisturbed.30
·
I take Luther's comment here to mean this.

For God to cause

some entity to cease to be would be action contrary to God's
30
WA XVIII, p. 710.
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creative nature: to give being to things.
.

the destruction of being.

Satan is the cause of

.

God cannot act

demonica~y.

Therefore

evil beings, having come into existence, the problem they constitute cannot simply be solved by causing them not to exist.

The

divine response to the destructive satanic principle must fall
between the extremes of complete permissiveness--which would lead
to the complete frustration of divine creativeness--and the
cessation of divine creativeness i.e., ceasing to preserve His
creation, which is contrary to the divine nature.

The middle

role is creative intervention, divine action counter to the
destructive activities of Satan, by a new continuous creation.
Thus, a third principle of explanation for the operation of the
universe, divine counter-action to the destructive operation of
satanic forces, is proposed by Luther.

God both preserves the

defective operation of Satan and counter-acts it.
hand, everything which happens, both good and evil,

On the one
co~tinues

to

be done by God ontologically, for God causes some things to
happen by the deficient instrumentation of satanic forces.

On

the other hand, on the manichaean level, good is done by God,
while evil is done by Satan.

On the ontological level God is

the cause of evil since He continues to pursue His course with
means which have become defective.

On the manichaean level Satan

is responsible for evil as he endeavors to rob creation of its
being.

Meanwhile, God counteracts this influence by creating

new being.

~----~------------------------------~------------~
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••• When God works in us, the will is changed under
the sweet influence of the Spirit of God. Once
more it desires and acts, not of compulsion, but
of its own desires and spontaneous inclinations.
Its bent cannot be altered by any oppositions; it
cannot be mastered or prevailed upon even by the
gates of hell; but it goes o~ willing, desiring and
loving good~ just as once it willed, desired and
loved evil.-'1
Since the nature of God is such that He cannot destroy what
He has made, the divine counteractive influence is brought to
bear on man, not by changing the motivations which are already
there, but by creating additional motivations which arecentered
on God as the good.

Thus, the human being who is influenced by

God experiences ne\-T feelings he has not experienced before and
has in mind a new object to which to devote himself.
objects and motivations remain, but
objects and motivations.
simul iustus

~

th~y

The old

are not the primary

Luther describes such a human being as

peccator. 32

He is capable of good and of evil

for he feels both motivations.

Since, then, he experiences

conflicting emotions, he can act on either.

Yet, since choice

is determined by the stronger emotion and emotions are stirred
up by God or Satan, the choice is not free.

31 wA XVIII, pp. 634-635.
32 For instance in the passage:- "Therefore, everyone who
is justified [by God] is still a sinner." Luther's SMmmtliche
Schriften, XIX, "Ftlnf Disputa tionen tlber R8m. 3, 28.", "Diedritte Disputation", 24, p. 1452. Compare also: "So a Christian
is both righteous and a sinner at the same time, saint and pervert, opponent and son of God." Commentary .2.!2 Galatians,
WA XXXX, I, p. 368.

~

--------------------------------------------------------,
52
On the manichaean level, as on the ontological level, there
is no function for human liberum arbitrium.

Everything relative
/

to human action is motivated either as the result of divine
activity or of satanic activity.

In a famous quotation, Luther

says,
Man's will is like a beast standing between two
riders. If God rides, it wills and goes where God
wills; as the Psalm says, 'I am become as a beast
before thee, and I am ever with thee' [Ps. 73.22-3].
If Satan rides, it wills and goes where Satan wills.
Nor may it choose to which rider it will run, or
which it will seek; but the riders th~mselves fight
to decide who shall have and hold it. 3
The ethical role of the man of God is a special kind of
problem, for, unlike man in his original condition, strictly
motivated by God and unlike man after the fall, strictly motivated by Satan, the man of God experiences the effect of both
divine and satanic influence.
new.

He is two persons, the old and the

He does not stand neutrally between the two, able to go

either way indiscriminately, but rather is, by grace na·turally
reoriented again toward God.

He identifies himself with his

better nature, so that to act evilly would, as in the original
act of human evil, be a turning away, an actus aversus from God.
THE EXISTENTIAL IMPLICATION: HUMAN FREEDOM AND ACTION
Is there any sense in which human action can be spoken of
33WA XVIII, p. 635.

~·------------------~----------------------------------~
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as arising from free choice?
If we do not want to drop this term altogether
[liberum arbitriurn]--which would realiy be the/
safest and most Christian thing to do--we may
still in good faith teach people to use it to
credit man with liberum arbitrium in respect,
not of what is above him but of what is below
him. That is to say, man should realize that
in regard to his money and possessions he has
a right to use them, to do or leave undone,
according to his own "free will" - though that
very "free will" is over-ruled by the liberum
arbitriL~ Qf God alone, according to His own
pleasure.34
And though I should gra~t that liberum arbitrium
by its endeavors can advance in some direction,
namely, in the direction of good works, or the
righteousness of the civil or moral law, yet it
does not advance toward God's righteousness, nor
does God deem its efforts in any respect ~Torthy
to gain His righteousness; for He ~ays that His
righteousness stands without law. 3
On this third level, then, finally we encounter a sense of
3 4 Ibid., p. 638. Bracketed mat~rial mine.
35 Ibid., pp. 767-768. Note also this remark by Luther:
" ••• man falls under two kingdoms. In one he is guided by his own
choice and counsel apart from precepts and mandates of God, that
is with respect to things inferior to himself. Here he rules
and is Lord, left in the hands of his own counsel. Not that
God deserts him there in the sense that He does not cooperate
in all things. But that He leaves to him a freedom for choosing
and does not hem him in with any laws and prescriptions. And if
you would use a paraphrase: The gospel leaves us in the hands of
our mvn counsel that '\o.1e may rule over things and use them as we
wish, ••• • In the other kingdom, however, [in relations with
other persons and with God] man is not left in the hands of his
own counsel, but is led and guided by the will and counsel of
God, so that, just as in his own kingdom he is led by his own
choice apart from the commands of another, so in the kingdom of
God he is led by the precepts of another apart from his own
choosing." l.Q.!£., p. 672. Bracketed material mine.
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liberum arbitrium which, however limited it may be, is not
36
empty.
/

36 To clarify what Luther has in mind here, it may be of
use to cite other quotations from works not directly the product
of Luther himself but accepted by him. "If you estimate the
power of the human will as touches its natural capacities according to human reason, it cannot be denied but that there is in it
a certain kind of liberty in things external. These are matters
which you yourself might experience to be within your power, such
as: to greet or not to greet a man; to put on certain attire or
not to put it on; to eat meat or not to eat it as you will. Upon
this contingency of external works those philosophers who attributed freedom to the will, have fastened their eyes. In truth,
however, because God does not look upon external works but upon
the inner motions of the heart, Scripture has recorded nothing
about such freedom. Those who do fashion their character by an
external and affected affability teach this sort of freedom,
especially the philosophers and the more recent theologians."
Melanchthon, .Q.I!• ill•, pp. 75-76. "Of Free Will [sic] they [the
Lutherans] teach that man's will has some liberty to choose civil
righteousness, and to work things subject to reason ••• • These
things are said in as many words by Augustine in his HypognostiSQn, Book III: 1 We grant that all ~~n have a free will, free
inasmuch as it has the judgment of reason; not that it is thereby
capable without God, either to begin, or, at least, to complete
aught in things pertaining to God, but only in works of this
life, whether good or evil. "Good" I call those works which
spring from the good in nature, such as, willing to labor in the
field, to eat and drink, to have a friend, to clothe oneself, to
build a house, to marry a wife, to raise cattle, to learn divers
useful arts, or whatever good pertains to this life. For all of
these things are not without dependence on the providence of God;
yea, of Him.and through Him they are and have their beginning.
"Evil" I call such works as willing to worship an idol, to commit
murder, etc.'" "Article XVIII: Of Free Will", Augsburg Confession, Concordia Triglot, The Symbolical Books of the Ev. Lutheran
Church, ed. F. Bente, St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1917,
pp. 50-53. "The human will has liberty in choice of works and
things which reason comprehends by itself. It can to a certain
extent render civil righteousness or the righteousness of works;
it can speak of God, offer to God a certain service by an outward
work, obey magistrates, parents; in the choice of an outward work
it can restrain the hands from murder, from adultery, from theft.
Since there is left in human nature reason and judgment concerning
objects subjected to the senses, choice between things and the

i
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There is a kind of human liberum arbitrium, not because the
human will is free, but because human powers of cognition are
.

free.

/

Man is able to summon up images, to make deductions, to

determine implications, etc., to which he himself responds.

He

is able to hold in his consciousness more than one alternative
which interests him.
subdue the earth.
since the fall.
judgment.

He can use his strength and imagination to

He is limited in imagination and cognition,
He can be stirred up to act against his better

He can enter into whatsoever external relationship he

wills with his fellows.
interests.

He is limited only by his ingenuity and

He cannot terminate his own being nor can he summon

up any emotions other than those that of their own accord rise
up within him.

And even if he takes steps by the development of

good habits and a regular life to control and direct his impulses
he has no guarantee that at any time, often when least expected,
there will not rise up within him impulses alien to what he
liberty and power to render civil righteousness are also left.
For Scripture calls this the righteousness of the flesh which the
carnal nature, i.e., reason, renders by itself, without the Holy
Ghost, a 1 though the pov1er of concupiscence is such that men more
frequently obey evil dispositions than sound judgment. And the
devil, who is efficacious in the godless, as Paul says, Eph. 2,2
does not cease to incite this feeble nature to various offenses.
These are the reasons why even civil righteousness is rare among
men, as we see that not even the philosophers themselves, who
seem to have aspired after this righteousness, attained it."
"Article XVIII: Of Free Will", Apology .2f Augsburg Confession,
Concordia Triglot, pp. 334-335.

.!j
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wishes to be or to do.

37

37An elaboration of the capacity of this limited notion
of hlli~n liberum arbitrium constitutes the bulk of chapter IV and
is interwoven into chapter v.

CHAPTER III
DETERMINIS.H AND ACTION--THE PROBLEN OF JUSTICE
In the development of a thought structure, be it the formulation of a political constitution, a social procedure, a game
or a philosophic worldview such as occupies these pages, the
theorist, if he is to do an adequate job must at minimum 1) set
forth the structure clearly, exhibiting its essential elements
and their relationships and 2) test the structure for internal
contradictions and inconsistencies.
chapter II.

The former activity oecupies

The latter is the task of chapter III.

Since Luther views reality as activity occuring on three
levels, but comprehended in and determ.ined by the first leve 1,
God exercising the power of liberum arbitrium, Luther's task, set
forth in this chapter, is to justify that activity in relation
to what occurs on the other levels.

Inasmuch as the approach

culminates in the development of an ethical structure, as opposed
to a scientific structure, chapter II centers on the origin of
good and evil; this chapter centers on the justice of divine
determinism particularly as it relates to human action.

For

purposes of order in the chapter Luther's arguments are grouped
under four heads, each representing a separate challenge to the
adequacy of Luther's approach.

The first challenge limits itself

to the ontological level {but in so doing treats all the levels
universally, since they can be reduced to the first level),

~

~------------------------------------------:J::;;.-

58

,.,_)~

claiming simply that God is unjust.

The seconc

poses that there is an inconsistency between the

<'tge

pro-

.ogical

L

/

activity of God and the view of God as loving man re,realed by God
in His activity on the manichaean level: in brief that what God
claims He is and what He does are not in agreement.

The third

challenge proposes that there is an inconsistency between the
manichaean and the existential levels.

The demands which God

makes upon man in His law exceed man's capacity to fulfill them.
The fourth challenge proposes an inconsistency between the
existential and the ontological levels.

Human action does not

consistently receive its just consequences in rewards and punishments from God.

Good is not always rewarded with good and evil

with evil.
Since these four challenges exhaust the number of relationships which the activity of divine liberum arbitrium has in the
structure of Luther's thought and since the structure is reducible to that activity, if each challenge is successfully refuted,
the structure is internally consistent.
CHALLENGE ONE: THE JUSTICE OF GOD
So many men of great ability who have stood the test
of time ••• demand that God should act according to
human right [iure humano] and do what seems right to
them or He should cease to be God. The secrets of
His majesty shall profit Him nothing; let Him render
a reason why He should be God or why He wills what
has no appearance of justice--as if you would ask
Mr. Shoemaker or Mr. Beltrnaker to sit in judgment!
Flesh does not dignify God with so much glory as to
believe that He is just and good when He speaks and
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acts above and beyond what the Justinian Code has
laid down or the fifth book of Aristotle. Let the
majesty, Creator of all things, submit Himself to
one of His creatures .1
/
The questioning of the justice of divine action presupposes
that human standards hold for God.

Since God is above all rules

and is Himself the rule for all, the presupposition is fallacious.2

11 If His justice would be such that it could be judged

just by human reckoning, clearly it would not be divine and would
differ in no way from human justice. 113
Secondly, a challenge to the justice of God in a particular
case assumes that one knows the mind of God, that one knows God's
intent.

11 Since He is the one and true God, therefore totally

incomprehensible and inaccessible to human reason, it follows,
yea, it is necessary that also His justice be incomprehensible

•••

• 114

Again, the challenge rests on a fallacious assumption. 5
1WA XVIII, p. 729.

2

.
Compare the passage cited in Chapter II, pages 36-37.
"God is He for Whose will there is no cause or rationale which
prescribes for Him any sort of rule or measurement, since there
is nothing equal or superior to Him, but rather He Himself is the
rule for everything. Ibid., p. 712.
3
!lli.' p. 784.
4 Idem.
5
compare also: "••• concerning that secret will of
Majesty there can be no debate and human temerity must be recalloo
and restrained, which, in continual preversity, ignoring necessary matters, always seeks after and assails it, nor should it
occupy itself with the scrutiny of that secret majesty which
cannot be reached, inasmuch as it dwells in inaccessible light,
by the testimony of Paul. 11 [I Tim. 6:16] .!..£.i..Q., p. 689.

I
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Questions like "Does God act justly?" or its opposite "Does
God act unjustly?" have the appearance of

rneaningf~lness.

If,

hmY"ever, we substitute for the term "God" in each question an
expression which for Luther would. be equivalent "He Who always
acts justly", the questions are, respectively, tautological and
self-contradictory, for the former asks "Does He Who always acts
justly act justly?" while the latter asks "Does He Who always
acts justly act unjustly?"
In summary, then, challenges to the justice of God involve
fallacious assumptions, and arise from an inadvertent mislocation
of the ontological level of divine activity, reducing it to the
existential level.
CHALLENGE TWO: DIVINE WORD AND WORK
A second challenge to the justice of God arises from the
apparent inconsistency between God's revelation of Himself in
Scripture and in the incarnation of Jesus as concerned for people
and loving all of them, and the deliberate damnation of some
people to eternal torment.

The inconsistency is epitomized by

Christ's weeping over Jerusalem.

"It is the will of the same

God incarnate to weep, deplore and groan over the lost state of
the impious as that of the divine Majesty which on purpose
leaves and rejects some so that they perish." 6 God purports both
6

Ibid., pp. 689-690.
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to abandon some deliberately and at the same time to mourn their
loss.

/

No doubt this offends to the highest degree common
sense of natural reason, that God wilfully [~
voluntate ~] should desert, harden and damn people,
as though He delighted in sins and such great and
eternal torment of wretches, He Who is publicly
proclaimed as full of mercy and goodness, etc. It
seems iniquitous, cruel, and intolerable so to think
of God. This has been a great offense to so many
great men through the ages ••• • For this reason
such sweating and labor has been devoted to exonerate
the goodness of God by blaming the will of man, ••• • 7
The effort to which Luther alludes in the last sentence can
be expressed simply by the following formal argument.
Proposition 1: The just will of God is the cause of all that
happens.
Proposition 2: Some men suffer the evil of eternal damnation.

In

order to preserve the justice of God and to keep Him blameless of
the damnation of the reprobate a third proposition is proposed:
Proposition 3: Men do good and evil of their own free will.
Luther argues that this set of three propositions is not
consistent.

It is an antilogism.

The third proposition is

inco~

sistent with the first.

For if men act freely, those acts are a
limitation on the freedom of God, which is impossible. 8 It

follows, then, that an appeal to human free will is inadequate
to resolve the problem.

Because proposition 1 is true, 3 has to

71QiS., p. 719.

8

see quotation 14, chapter II, pp. 36-37.
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be false.

9

The question of the apparent inconsistency between 1 and 2
/

is resolved by Luther in this fashion.

We have no claims on God,

since we are His creatures, but He has full rights against us to
demand whatsoever He pleases.
owes us nothing.

"No injury is done to us since God

He has received nothing from us and He has

promised us nothing except as much as He has willed and please~'l
Damnation follm-.•s as a natura 1 consequence of the condition of
the impious.

The only escape from damnation is by divine inter-

vention, but no one has a right to this.
.
.
. h
11
d oes, H 1s act1ons are r1g teous.

Hence, whatever God

Since God has rights relative to man but man has no rights
relative to God, God is not limited by the principles of reciprocal and distributive justice.

The principle of equality,

however, is not nullified by the fact that there are no human
rights relative to God.

Does one have a right to expec:t equa 1

treatment from God as someone else?

If no one is any more or

9John Calvin was influenced by Luther's argument in
the development of his own theology. He attempted to remove the
force of the apparent inconsistency between 1 and 2 by arguing
that the damnation of the impious contributes to the glory of
God. Unlike Luther, he developed a double predestination theory
to explain justification and damnation. Like Luther he denied
the truth of 3. Cf. Calvin's Institutes of the Christian
Religion, in particular Book II, chapter vand Book III, chapter

XXI.

IOWA XVIII, p. 717.
11 God is bound by His promises and can be held to them.
These, of course, are rights bestowed by God rather than arising
from the nature of the divine/human relationshi •
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less deserving of grace than anyone else, why does God save some
and not others?

Why does He deal unequally with men?
/

The issue is legitimate.

The questions are reasonable, but,

under present conditions, unanswerable to human satisfaction.
\..Jhat is at issue is divine consistency.

If X and Y are two

individuals between whom, before God, there is no difference,
since both lack rights, if God acts in manner m toward X why does
He not act in manner m toward Y?

To claim that God ought to act

in manner m toward Y would be presumptuous, for it would assume
that Y has a right to be treated in manner m by God (which right
Y does not have) or that God is duty bound to treat all men

alik~

Since God can act however He pleases, the latter alternative is
patently false.

He cannot, however, act arbitrarily.

God is

bound by the necessity of unchangeability.
Luther distinguishes between God's hidden and revealed will
to resolve the issue.

The distinction is roughly between the

will of God operative on the ontological level and on the
manichaean level.
revealed by God.

Only the operation on the manichaean level is
God exhibits Himself as loving men, as hating

and overcoming evil, etc.

He does not, however, reveal His

overarching ontological order whereby He reconciles good and evil
and unifies in purposeful fashion the creative and destructive
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principles in the universe. 12

The attempt to learn why some are

saved and not others transcends the limits of human competence
and comprehension and results in confusion.

/

One is faced with

the sheer will of God, with pure divine impulses, which will be
understood first in eternity when God is seen face to face. 13
CHALLENGE THREE: VALIDITY OF THE ETHICAL "OUGHT"
Insofar as divine determinism relates to the manichaean and
existential levels of Luther's thought structure, the problem of
justice revolves primarily around the question of human moral
responsibility.

Implicit in the argument counter to Luther's

position is the principle that moral obligation implies the

1211 ••• God works evil in us,.that is, through us, not
as a fault (culpa) of God, but because of our defectiveness, who,
since we are by nature evil, but God is truly good, impelling
(rapiens) us to action by his own action according to the nature
of His omnipotence, is not able to do anything other than that He
Himself as good does evil because of an evil instrument, granted
that He by means of His wisdom uses this evil well for His glory
and our salvation." WA XVIII, p. 711.
1 3Ant1c1pat1ng
• ·
•
the natura 1 1mpu
.
1 se to reJect
.
1·1m1ts
.
to
human competence, Luther remarks, "Indeed, here Reason will say
in her nosy and talkative fashion, 'That's a nice escape hatch
we've invented for ouself, that whenever we are hard pressed by
the force of arguments we run back to that awe-inspiring will of
Majesty and where our adversary has been troublesome we reduce
him to silence no differently than the astrologers who with the
invention of their "epicycles" elude all questions about the
motion of the entire heavens.• We answer that it not our invention, but a precept founded on the divine scriptures~' Ibid.,
p. 690.
----
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ability to do what is necessary to discharge the obligation.

14

There is an inconsistency between the demands which God makes of
.

/

man in divine law, revealed as part of the recreative activity
of God on the manichaean level, and the human capacity to act,
exhibited on the existential level.
love Him and one another.
in their fallen condition.
obligation upon them?

They are incapable of such motivation
Is God justified in laying such an

Or does their inability to discharge the

obligation excuse them from it?
does not excuse.

Men are commanded by God to

Luther argues that inability

His argument rests on an analysis of lin-

guistic usage.
Both grammarians and boys on street corners are aware
that nothing more is signified by words in the imperative mood than that which ought to be done. What,
14Augustine, to whom both free-will and anti-free-will
advocates have appealed at various times in the history of the
Church, is ambiguous on the topic treated in this section. He
says, for instance, in the treatise On Grace !!.!!Q ~ R!.ll, "Now
God has revealed through His Holy Scriptures that there is
liberum arbitrium in man. Hm-1 He has revealed this I cannot
recount in human language, but in divine. First of all, God's
commands would be useless to man unless he had liberum arbitrium,
so that by executing them [the commands] he would obtain the
promised rewards." This passage appears to be in opposition to
Luther. On the other hand, in the same treatise Augustine says,
"There is a liberurn arbitrium always within us, but it is not
always good, for it is either free from righteousness when it is
in bondage to sin--then it is wicked--or else it is free from sin
when it is in bondage to righteousness--then it is good." This
passage appears to support Luther. A readily available English
translation of Augustine's treatise is found in Volume I of
Whitney J. Oate~ Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, New York:
Random House, Inc., 1948. The passages cited are found on pages
734 and 758.
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however is done or is able to be done must be treated
by indicative verbs. How does it happen, the~ that
you theologians are twice as inept as boys, in/that
as soon as you catch hold of one imperative verb you
proceed to infer an indicative, as though as soon as
something is commanded it necessarily is done or can
be done.IS
Hume several centuries later argued the impossibility of
.
f rom an ~n
. d.~cat i ve. 16 Luther is arguing
.
de d uc~ng
an i mperat~ve
against the possibility of deducing an indicative from the
legitimacy of an imperative.

Capacity to act does not follow

necessarily from obligation to act.

Therefore, it is not unjust

for God to impose obligations which cannot be fulfilled.
On what does the "obligation implies ability" principle
rest?

On the function of language: it would be foolish or absurd

to issue commands if those who heard them would not be able to
1 5wA XVIII, p. 677. Luther is referring here to
Erasmus' argument that scripture passages containing divine
commands prove that men have liberum arbitrium. For if men have
the obligation, then they must have the ability to discharge what
God commands.
16
"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto
met with, I have always rernark'd, that the author proceeds for
some time in the -ot,d inary way of reasoning, and establishes the
being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs;
when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the
copulations of propositions, "is" and "is not", I meet with no
propositions that is not connected with an 11 ought 11 or an "ought
not". This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last
consequence. For as this "ought" or "ought not", expresses some
new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou 1 d be
observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should
be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new
relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely
different from it." Book III, section i, of A Treatise of Human
Nature. The passage is found on page 469 of the ~. A. SelbyBigge edition, Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1951.
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obey them.

The mistaken assumption of this argument., however, is

that command-type language has only one function, t? secure the
fulfillment of its content.

Luther argues that imperatives have

a variety of functions.
Do we not very frequently make evident impotence and
impossibility by such ways of speaking? As, for
instance, 11 If you want to equal Virgil in singing,
my 1'-faevius, other songs are needed." 11 If you want
to surpass Cicero, Scotus, you need to replace your
cunning with the highest eloquence • 11 ''If yoti want
to be compared with David, you need to give birth
to similar psalms. 11 Here clearly are indica ted
things impossible for average abiliti~s, granted
that they all can be accomplished by divine powers.
The same holds true in scriptural matters: by such
assertions is pointed out what can be done in us
17
by the power of God, but we cannot do it ourselves.
The apparent inconsistency between the manichaean and the
existential levels of activity resulting in a state of apparent
injustice can be exhibited by the following antilogism.

From the

manichaean level comes the command of God to man: Lovel

The

existential fact of the matter is that one cannot just.turn
particular emotions on and off.
direct control

Emotions are not under our

Divine love, such as is

~ommanded

and beyond this, must be generated in us by God.

by God, over
These two

states of affairs are represented by the following propositions:
17
wA XVIII, p. 691. Compare also: "For this reason the
words of the law are spoken [by God], not to affirm a power of
the will, but to illuminate blind reason, that it may see that
its own light is nothing and that there is no strength [virtus]
of will. 'By the law is the knowledge of sin', says Paul; he
does not say the abolition or avoidance of sin." Ibid., p. 677.
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Proposition 1: Men are to love God and their neighbor.
Proposition 2: Emotions are not subject to human control.
/

Because of the opposition between the two propositions a
third is sometimes suggested:
Proposition 3: Obligation implies the ability to discharge it.
The three propositions form an antilogism.
false.

At least one is
18
Given the truth of 3, proposition 1 is false.

If propositions 1 and 3 are taken as true, 2 is false.
Erasmus, at least in the fashion Luther interpreted his argument,
opted for this approach in the famous debate between the two men.
The approach is faced with extreme difficulties.

It is workable

so long as divine commands are interpretable as requiring particular actions, or if, in divine cornmqnds involving personal
motivation, terms denoting emotions can be replaced with terms
denoting actions, e. g., if "love" can be defined in behavioral
terms.

But if this cannot be done, the approach must directly

oppose the meaning and implications of proposition 2 and assert,
contrary to generally accepted psychological fact, that one can
at will summon up particular motivations.
18 This direction is taken with variations by the early
twentieth century deontologists, Ross, Prichard, and Sidgwick.
An excellent analysis of the Decalogue using this argumentation
is found in the tenth chapter of G. E. Hoore 1 s book, Philosophical
Studies, entitled "The Nature of M>oral Philosophy". New York:
Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1922. It was later republished as a
Harbrace paperback volume.

I.
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Luther accepted the truth of propositions 1 and 2.
quently, he, of necessity, rejected 3 as false.

Conse-

Th? implications

of his approach are at least twofold: the scope of the ethical
"ought" covers both action and motivation and, because men apart
from the activity of Qod cannot be properly motivated, they cannot fulfill their obligations to God, of and by themselves.

The

practical function of the ethical "ought", then, is not to prescribe behavior, but to reveal the incapacity of men to act as
they ought.

Luther, thus, is committed to a motivational ethic,

the demands of which require divine involvement.
\-/hat of the apparent inconsistency between propositions 1
and 2.

They are inconsistent only if 3 is assumed_ to be true.

If obligation is not limited by the ability to fulfill it, then
there is no inconsistency.

CHALLENGE FOUR: HUMAN ACTION AND DIVINE RESPONSE
The final relationship which needs examination is that
between the existential and the ontological, the divine rewarding
and punishing of humans acts which are good and bad.

The general

rationale of the ontological operation of the universe follows
this pattern.

Actions have their appropriate consequences which

follow naturally and necessarily.

"If you sink in water you will
suffocate; if you swim out you will be saved. 1119 In contrast
to these are what might be called moral consequences.
19WA XVIII, p. 693.

Here a
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distinction must be made between the worthiness of the actor and
the worth of the act.

Since the worthiness of the actor is
/

determined by his motivation and, since he has no control over
his motives, but is motivated either by God or Satan, there is no
worth which is earned by the actor.
consequences of actions.

We are, thus, limited to the

Actions are done either under compul-

sion or not under compulsion.

There is neither reward or punish-

ment for acts done under compulsion.

Of acts not done under com-

pulsion, if they are done willingly, reward or punishment follows
depending on whether they are good or bad acts.

The fact that

one cannot change the nature of his will is irrelevant.

In the

determination of temporal rewards and punishments, then, God is
guided by the goodness or evilness of the act whether it was done
willingly or not.

He is not guided by the motivation of the

actor.

The reward or punishment is meted out in this present

life.

In contrast to this, the relationship which obtains in

eternity

be~~een

God and men is determined by the motivational

relationship which obtains between God and men at the time of
exit from this life.

Moral consequences follow with the same
necessity as natural consequences. 20
It does not take much experience of life to discover that
there is an inconsistency between this rationale and what happens
20

Ibid., pp. 693-694.
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as a consequence of human behavior.

The lament about the pros-

pering of the wicked and the suffering of the innocent is an
/

ancient and oft repeated refrain.

Luther reconciles the incon-

sistency by an appeal to the life to come.

"There is a life

after this life, in which, whatever is not punished and remunerated here will be punished and remunerated there, for this
life is nothing but a precursor or rather a beginning of a future
life. 1121
In this fashion Luther justifies the structure of his
system, reconciling the levels of activity with one another.

He

argues that much of what happens in life requires divine enlightenment for us to reconcile it with what we experience.

Even

the~

there is that which transcends our comprehension and, as a result
must be taken on faith.
Three lights are behind me: the light of nature, the
light of grace, the light of glory. In the light of
nature it cannot be resolved how it is just for the
good to be afflicted and the evil to fare well. But
the light of grace has resolved it. In the light of
grace it cannot be resolved how God can damn him who
is not able with any of his powers but to sin and to
be a prisoner. Here both the light of nature and the
light of grace say that the fault is not that of the
miserable man, but the injustice of God for they are
not able to judge otherwise of a God who crowns the
impious man freely, without merit and does not crown
another but damns him who is perhaps less, certainly
not more, impious. But the light of glory tells a
21 Ibid., p. 785.
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different story and someday will point out God, "'hose
judgment alone is of incomprehensible justice, as a
God manifestly the justest of the just, prov~ed that
in the meantime we believe it, warned and strengthened
by the example of how the light of grace in similar
fashion explains that which is a mystery for the
light of nature.2
22 Idem

CHAPTER IV
ACTIONS AND MOTIVATION--THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LUTHE~ 1 S ETHICS
The isolation in Chapter II of a sense of human liberum
arbitrium which is not empty demonstrates the possibility of an
ethic.

Its morphology has not yet been exhibited.

Since

Luther's ontological thought structure has developed theocentrically, it is necessary at this point to reapproach it anthropocentrically in order to expose the principles which underlie
Luther's ethic.
Luther's view of reality is structured by the ruler/ruled
relationship.

~Ian

stands in the midst of the hierarchy of being

Superior to him are God and the good and evil angels.
to him are animals, plants and inanimate things.

Inferior

According to

the original order of perfection a descending order of command
coupled with an ascending order of obedience would guarantee the
peaceful and harmonious operation of the whole realm of creation.
This perfection is marred by the demonic interference with the
ontological operation of the universe and exhibits itself by the
manichaean dialectic.
While man modifies that which lies beneath him by imposing
his force externally upon it, he himself is modified both
externally and internally by those forces which are above him.
Because the connection between divine activity and human ethical
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behavior is found in inner motivation1 the transition from
ontology to ethics can be made in two ·stages: 1)

fro~

ontology to

psychology by an examination of the relation of divine activity
to human motivation and 2) from psychology to ethics by an examination the relation of divine motivating to human ethical action.
ACTION AND HOTIVATION
God acts in two distinctive ways: creatively and prescriptively.

The creative activity of God, as we have previously

indicated, is also of two sorts: original ontological creativity
whereby entities are brought into being and preserved in their
being, and re-creative activity to counteract demonic damage.
Luther speaks of the two expressions of the will of God, particularly exhibited in His verbal revelation of Himself, as law and
gospel. 2

In the narrow sense, gospel tends to be restricted to

re-creative activity and is, thus, properly restricted to the
manichaean level of meaning.

If, however, one interprets the

notion of gospel more broadly as the expression of divine goodness, i.e., all divine creative activity, it becomes apparent
1 .
Luther uses the ty~o verbs, agere and rapere to describe this activity of inner "moving". The former verb is used
most frequently in the active voice to describe divine or demonic
activity. The latter verb is usually used passively to describe,
from a human experiential standpoint "being moved". For Luther's
interpretation of the relation of these two verbs see footnote 5
of this chapter. Note than he says: agi=rapi.
2

For Luther's treatment of the topic see WA XVIII,
pp. 680-684.
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that on all three levels of Luther's view of reality, the ontological, the manichaean and the existential, God e~presses Himself both in the form of law and of gospel.

Since God relates

Himself to man both externally and internally, there are, thus,
six distinguishable ways whereby God expresses Himself as law and
six as gospel, two of each on each of three levels. 3
The

Activit~

.Q.f Q.Q.g

!t§_

Law

On the ontological level the outer expression of the will of
God is evident in the apparent purposefulness, order and regularity of the operation of the universe.

While it is not

possi~e

rationally to apprehend God as the opera tor nor his ends, it is
possible to derive from experience patterns of regularity in the
universe and to express them in the form of natural laws and to
develop natural sciences.

Since the will of God, functioning as

liberum arbitriurn, is unknowable, whatever is discovered as
'c
'c

3viewed in theological terms the three levels of divine .·
activity correspond to the distinctive activities of the Father, ....,,
the Son and the Holy Spirit of the Trinity. Due to the nature of
the theological problems with which Luther found himself forced
to deal, his theological formulations developed in greatest
detail matters having to do with the manichaean level, the
activity of the Son. Subsequent Lutheran theology has tended to
follow in the same pattern. Hence, the ontological level and the
existential level of Luther's philosophic world view remain to
this day relatively undeveloped, although in recent years, since
World War II, due to the influence of existentialism on Lutheran
thought there has been some exploration of these areas by Barth,
Tillich and others.
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natural law is not identical with God's expression of His will as
law but follows from the fact that He does so expreJs it.

That

is to say, regularities are apprehended because God acts consistently.
The inner ontological expression of the will of God is
exhibited by the existence of a sense of right and wrong and the
activity of conscience.

We have natural feelings of disapproval

and guilt.

These arise from what Luther and Melanchthon call
~naturae, laws of our nature. 4
On the manichaean level, part of the activity of God as law
is the clear expression of His will in Scripture, notably in the
ten commandments.

God also presents Himself in the consciousness

of people who have encountered His revelation of Himself in
Scripture as one to be loved or as a reason for loving one's
fellows.

Because He rises up into consciousness as an alter-

native to self-love He is naturally resisted and hated, or, at
best is modified to serve, not as an ultimate object of affection
4 From these natural sources come what men naturally
feel about morality. Of the duty to love God there is just a
trace of awareness. Because of it societies tend to produce
religions. They feel a need to have a deity. The demands of the
second table of the law are ~ore clearly sensed. Luther claims
that one tends not to find a society where killing is permitted
within the society, adultery is sanctioned, disobedience to
authority is permitted or theft tolerated. They are inimical to
the existence of a viable society. Men seem spontaneously to
"know" that such behavior is wrong. The actions bother, exercise
or anger them. See also Melanchthon, .212• cit., "On Law", pp.
110-117.
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but as a pattern of action.

He is reduced to a purely paradig·

rnatic function, a moral example.

/

Finally, on the existential level God expresses Himself as
law externally by the goodness of the lives of the converted and
internally in their consciousness and in their expression of His
motivation towards others.
~

Activity of God

~

Gospel

The creative ontological activity of God is expressed by the
dynamic persistence of the universe and the integrity and order
which it exhibits.

Internally it is experienced in the sense

of well·being, harmony, health, pleasure and contentment.

On the

manichaean level the re-creative activity of God has been
expressed historically and is retained in verbal form in the
salvation history of the Old and New Testament, culminating in
the incarnation of God Himself in history, leaving behind Himself
through history the verbal and sacramental records and reve·
lations of Himself.

Internally He presents Himself to men's

consciousnesses as the Holy One of God.

Finally, on the existen-

tial level God expresses His goodness externally in the continual
creation and preservation of the Church, Whose presence is
detected in certain outward ways, by the use of Word and sacra·
ments, and the expression of divine motivation in behavior.
Inwardly one is aware of the testimony of the Spirit in moving

~ ------------------------~----------------------------~
r
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one to act. 5

Thus, in multiform ways God makes His presence

known in motivating His creation to activity.

/

The Demonic Motivation of Men
Since human beings are divinely created, they are creatures
of purpose.

Inasmuch, however, as they are born ignorant of God,

incapable of loving God and directed toward evil, they lack the
purpose of their existence.

Hence, consciously or not, each,

from infancy attempts to make sense out of his existence in order
that he can achieve a purpose, for he cannot live a meaningless
existence.

Lacking the knowledge of his subjection to God, he

unconsciously becomes his own god, blindly aping the example of
Satan his master, in seeking to be a self to which all else is
subject.

The image is that of a spoiled child.

" ••• man is

captive and corrupt, at the same time conceitedly having a very
high opinion of himself and ignorant of his own corruption and
. .

capt~v~ty.

"6

5Note Luther's comment, "Christian, indeed are moved
(aguntu~} not by liberum arbitrium but by the Spirit of God,
Romans 8. To be moved (a~i) indeed is not to move (agere) but
to be impelled (rapi} just as a saw or an axe is moved by a
carpenter." WA XVIII, p. 699. Since, of course, man possesses
choice over those things beneath him, unlike sa,.;rs and axes, the
analogy extends only to the notion of being moved.
6 rbid., p. 674. Compare also: "The ungodly man (as we
have said), like his prince Satan, is totally turned to himself
and to his own things. He doesn't look for God, nor does he care
for the things of God; he seeks his own riches, his own glories,
his own works, his own wisdom, his own power, his own kingdom,
completely his own--and he wants to enjoy it in peace. But if
someone opposes him or wants to lessen any of them in the least,
by that same perverted drive [aversione] by which he seeks those

j
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By nature his existence rests on demonic foundations, for
he is incapable of loving God.

Hence, his inner na;:ure is

irrational, impulsive and quixotic, infantile and belligerent.
He is at odds with himself and his world, emotional and subjective.

His springs of action arise to consciousness from

demonic sources.

Although he does not create his spr :i.ngs of

action he can use his cognitive powers to interpret them, to
select the means and manner of carrying out the courses of
action to which they impel him or to examine the implications of
the actions to which he is drawn.

The structure of the situation

can be exhibited by the Aristotelian practical syllogism.

The

end and the impetus to the act, the major term, comes into consciousness either from satanic or divine sources.
situation is the minor term.

The present

Man mediates the situation, using

his liberum arbitrium, by discovering the practical middle term,
the means of getting from the present situation to the desired
end.

If he is torn between conflicting impulses he can weigh the

alternatives and assemble the relevant factors; other alternatives may occur to him.

Finally, either one alternative

carries the field and is acted upon or he is frozen between
things, he is also moved and irritated and he rages against his
adversary. And he is no more capable of ceasing to rage than he
is of ceasing to desire or seek those things. And he can no more
cease to desire things for himself than he can cause himself not
to exist since he is still a creature of God, albeit a spoiled
one." p. 710.

80

opposed and equal inner forces.
Any impulse which rises to consciousness is either directly
or indirectly satisfied or it is frustrated.

But neither drive

satisfaction or drive frustration provide satisfactory solutions
to the total human situation.

Since natural human impulses are

defective, rising from a demonic source and directed to inferior
ends, the satisfying of the drive simply results in the attainment of ends which are inadequate.

The perverted condition is

reinforced by the success of· the act.
If in some way the drive is frustrated, reinforcement of the
perverted condition is avoided, but no remedy for the condition
out of which the perverted drive arose is achieved.

In addition,

the future capacity to act may be endangered and unwanted side
effects of unpredictable behavior stemming from drive frustration may occur.

Thus, although one may be able to achieve an

orderly and meaningful outward pattern of behavior, one cannot
by oneself resolve the internal problems of ones natural perverted condition.
The Divine Motivation Qi

~

God must intervene to solve the human predicament, both to
become the source of movement and the end of human existence.
Such intervention, as we have previously indicated, is resisted.
Since the advances of God encounter increased perversity [Luther
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describes it as hardenss of heart,J

7 God cannot merely present

Himself in consciousness as a possible object of

a~ection

or

exhibit therein the idea of an action pleasing to Him, for such
objects and ideas will be rejected.

He must move the psyche

itself in order that it will respond positively to such impulses
and ideas, i.e., He must convert the psyche itself to Himself.
Since God creates being but does not destroy it, the former
human nature remains after God gives the psyche a new nature,
although the new nature dominates the old.

The manichaean con-

flict which prior to conversion is external to the individual
(since he is totally under demonic control) is now internalized.
The converted human being experiences impulses both from God and
Satan and is attracted to each, according to his separate nature&
Whereas previously if he experienced both sorts of impulses he
was attracted to the one and repelled by the other and, in this
respect, experienced no problems, now divine ideas rise to his
consciousness, clothed in attractiveness; but, for that matter,
so do satanic.

He acts on both sorts, depending on which gains

the ascendency.

While his prime mover is divine and he accord-

ingly searches for ways he can give expression to this

motivatio~

he still retains his old perverted habit patterns and can return
to his old ways of acting.

7Note in particular Luther's explanation of hardness of
heart in the case of Pharaoh. WA XVIII, p. 711.
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One would expect a deterministic ontology to entail a
closed psychology.

Because of the manichaean level/in Luther's

worldview, there is a surprising openness on the psychological
level.

Man not only is plastic, developing and changing as a

personality, he is also unpredictable.

Novel springs of action

can well up within him in surprising and unexpected ways.

He is

capable of abrupt personality change, e.g., in conversion. Hence,
one who is responsive both to divine and satanic influences finds
himself upon occasion confronted in consciousness with novel
ideas and courses of action attractively presented which are
shocking, abhorrent, or thrillingly exciting.

From this wellS
spring of originality flow great ideas and original art.
Even
human beings of supposed limited capacity are capable under
ordinary circumstances of sudden changes of temperament, radical
modification of living, of acts of great goodness or profound
depravity.

Beneath the placid monotony of daily living with its

predictibility of behavior patterns there is a fluid uncertainty
in the inner world, capable at any moment of spewing forth a
radical act.
Whereas classical psychology praised the rational and castigated the passionate, Luther· sees the rational as itself ethically neutral.

It is the servant of the passions.

The conflict

8
Note how the passage cited in quotation 16, chapter
Ill on page 66 refers to artistic gifts as divinely given.
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is not between the rational and irrational, but within the
irrational itself.

God and evil have passionate

fo~dations.

For the good man the conflict goes on continually since he is
never free in this lifetime of his lesser nature.

But though he

is not free, that is to say, rid of it, he need not thereby be in
bondage to it.
MOTIVATION AND ACTION
Luther's conception of man, departing from the traditional
view laid down by Aristotle, related to the Christian faith by
Aquinas and adulterated by succeeding generations of Thomists and
Ockhamites, required also a new approach to human action.

Accord

ing to the traditional approach man's character is formed under
environmental influences by habituation.

His primary ethical

task is to develop good habits, by judicious use of reason (or by
following the example of good guides), coupled with the gracious
intervention of God in the formation of the spiritual virtues
revealed and commanded by God.

Virtue emerges by the doing of

the good.
For Luther, however, good habits--or good works--are not
enough.

One can reduce his outer life of action to a regulum.

His inner life remains fluid and under tension.

The fact that

there are two moving forces independent of human control which
intrude upon man's consciousness, stimulating him to action, one
good and the other evil, requires that he give attention, not onl
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to what he does--for his actions reinforce and shape the general
pattern of his life and modify his external relati9J1ships:..-but
also to determine what moves him.
Since men are of two sorts, those whose motivation is
satanic in origin and those who are moved by the divine, each
sort has a different kind of ethical problem.

The former are

separated from the ontological source of their existence and are
unable to achieve satisfaction with their lives because they lack
the proper end.

The latter are related to. their proper end and

motivated by Him, but they are also subject to alien motivations.
The latter need to sort out and to distinguish the divine from
the demonic sources of motion in order not to act from demonic
motivation.

The ways that such sorting can occur can simply be

exhibited by the following logical models.
The investigation of the character of a given piece of inner
experience, an impulse to act--together with its motivational
source--follows the hypothetico-deductive method, the logical
form of which is the hypothetical syllogism.

The major premise

contains the rationale of the investigation.

The minor premise

exhibits what is established by investigation.

The conclusion,

then, reveals what is entailed by that knowledge in the light of
the rationale.

There are four possible figures of the hypo-

thetical syllogism.

We shall examine each in turn in the con-

text of the problem at issue to determine what can and cannot
be learned about a given act and its motivation.
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Take as true the following porpositions: "If a motivation is
not divine it is demonic and vice-versa." and "If a9 action is
divinely mot iva ted it is not contrary to the law of God."

The

former principle functions for the purpose of our model somewhat
I

like the principle of contradiction.

We shall examine the four

figures of the hypothetical syllogism in terms of divine motivation.

By application of the former principle above we could,

simply, make the same determinations about demonic motivation.
The second principle will serve as the major premise for
each hypothetical syllogism.

For simplicity's sake we shall

symbolize it as: If M then not A, letting M=divine motivation and
A=action contrary to the law of God.
Self-analysis
Figure I

If M then not A.
M

therefore: not A.
The minor premise indicates one sort of

investiga~ion

which

one might undertake, to determine whether in a given piece of
inner experience the impulse to act comes from God.

If one can

establish it, the conclusion follows from it and the major premise that the act is not contrary to the law of God.

Since the
-

problem of the examination is to determine what the motivation
for the intended action is, the impulse to act must be traced to
its source.

If the source is God, then the action will not be

contrary to the will of God and it can properly be done.
no easy task.

It is
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One cannot simply take an objective stance toward oneself
in order cooly and a~lytically to dissect one's ps~che.
movement to self-analysis is itself motivated.

The

One has an

attitude toward oneself, be it love or hate, which cannot but
color the undertaking.

Under the influence of personal emotion

one is seldom a good judge of oneself.
Human beings naturally are loathe to confront themselves.
Ever since the first parents sought to hide themselves when they
had done wrong, it has been easier to dissemble than to confront
and exhibit oneself, even to oneself, whatever the.cause, shame,
fear, uncertainty, in the cold light of reality.
Psychology in the last fifty years has made us sensitive to
unconscious motivation.

The very word "unconscious" suggests

the unknowability of certain levels of motivation.

Hence, even

when we are being quite honest with ourselves we may not always
know the real source of our actions.
motives.

Sometimes we have ulterior

Frequently we act on several levels of meaning which

need to be sorted out and ranked.
Because urges which lead to action are sufficiently powerful
of themselves to result in action, it is easier to rationalize,
i.e., create a self-satisfying rationale for the impulses, than
to attempt to analyze its source prior to acting on it.

Unless

our impulses are personally revolting we tend to take them on
faith and act on them.

And, having acted on them, it is seldom

difficult for us to convince ourselves that what we have done is
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right, simply because we want to believe in our own good intentions.

Or perhaps the strength of the urge itself _persuades us

of the rightness of the act.

We feel so strongly about what we

did that we could not be wrong.
But let us suppose that these subjective problems are overcome.

Let us suppose that by careful reflection, introspection

and examination one has gotten back to the foundations on which
9
one's life rests, to what Luther calls one's 11 god".
The crucial
question now becomes "Is my god God?"
beyond all else?

Is it God that I love

Is He my primary source of motivation?

the ultimate Kierkegaardian question.

This is

Kierkegaard supposes that

at this point one can be guided only by the purity and the
singlemindedness of the emotion. 10 If the heart is pure, i.e.,
is honestly willing in all sincerity, then the action which
ensues is also pure and proper.
911

Luther's position argues that

A god means that from which we are to expect all good
and to which we are to take refuge in all distress. So that to
have a god is nothing else than to trust and believe him from
the whole heart. As I have often said, the confidence and faith
of the heart alone make both God and an idol. ••• That now, I
say, upon which you set your heart and put your trust is properly
your god." Luther's Large Catechism, Triglot Concordia, The
Symbolical Books of the Ev. Lutheran Church, ed. F. Bente, St.
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1921, pp. 580-581. Again,
"••• to have a god is to have something in which the heart
entirely trusts." .!.Qi9.., pp. 582-583.
10
cf. Kierkegaard 1 s Purity Qf Heart is to Will One
Thing. It is also a key question in contemporary religious
situation ethics.
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honesty is not enough.

Since there are two possible sources of

movement one can in all honesty serve Satan as well;as God.

It

makes a difference from which source the motivation comes.
Purity of motivation can be understood in two senses.

In

the one sense, Kierkegaard 1 s, the purity is a characteristic of
the relationship of the individual to the source of his motivation.

He relates faithfully to the source of his motivation,

be it what it may.

In the other sense, Luther's, purity refers

to the source of the motivation, is it God or Satan?

No amount

of faithful drinking from a polluted stream can make it pure.
Hence, the steadfastness and dedication of the individual to his
source does not make unnecessary an examination of the source.
How does one get at the source of one's motivation?

Ulti-

rnately it becomes a process of negative dialectic, the systematic
exclusion of sources which are not primary.

One weighs the

relative values of those things to which one gives oneself.

That

which is the object of primary trust, for the sake of which one
is willing to give up all else, and on which one ultimately
depends, is one's source.
it is satanic.

If it is anything or anyone but God

How can one tell if one's god is God?

paring it with God's expression of Himself as gospe1. 11
11 See pages 77 and 78.

By com-
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Comparison of

~

Figure II

If M then not A.

/

A

therefore: not M.
The second figure of the hypothetical syllogism indicates
that a second kind of investigation can be undertaken.

The in-

tended act can be examined and compared with the. will of God to
determine whether it is or is not contrary to that will.

For if

the act is contrary to the will of God, the motivation is not
divine.

If it is not divine, it is demonic and the act ought

not be performed.
The will of God is expressed by His law. 12

In his interpre-

tation of the ten commandments Luther claimed that the first
commandment contains implicitly within. it all the commandments,
for if one is loving God with his whole person the expression of
that love fulfills the other nine.

Hence, in his explanation of

each of the commandments after the first he follows the following
pattern: "We ought to be fearing and loving God so that we are
not doing •••••••••• , but rather are doing • • • • • • • • • • • .. 13 Love
for God entails love for one's fellowman.

The latter is motivated

by the former, or, as St. John said, one cannot claim to be loving
God and at the same time be hating his brother.

I John 3, 4:20.

12 see pages 75, 76 and 77.
13
Luther 1 s Large Catechism, QQ. cit., pp. 581-677. For
the formula see Luther's Small Catechism, £E• cit., pp. 539-543.
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Certain sorts of actions, then, naturally follow if one is
moved by God.

Certain other sorts of action are inconsistent

with love f or Go d •

/

If One is motivated by God the former will

occur spontaneously and the latter will not occur.
Since, however, one is not always motivated by God, there is
a diagnostic function for the law of God, to exhibit which sorts
of actions are inconsistent with the will of God, since they
14
follow on demonic motivation and cannot properly be done.
Social Limitations
Figure Ill

If M then not A.
Not M.
therefore, A or not A.1 5

The third figure exhibits the fact that a non-divine, i.e.,
demonic source of movement can consistently motivate to actions
which qua acts, are the same as acts consistent with the law of
God (e.g., one can be moved not to kill someone both by God and
Satan.) or to actions which are opposed (one can be motivated by
14

certain sorts of actions which are neither commanded
nor forbidden by God are not contrary to the will of God. Because there are such actions and because they would appear to be
prohibited if the consequent of the major premise above were
stated in positive terms, it has been stated in the negative.
15
Figures Ill and IV are derived from the illicit
figures of the hypothetical syllogism. The form of the syllogism
is legitimate since the conclusion is tautological exhibiting in
an alternation all possible conclusions.
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Satan to steal).

Because of this relationship between demonic

motivation and action it is possible for pagans to

outwardly
16
good lives and for supposed people of God to be hypocrites.
~ad

What of the motivation of persons other than oneself?
According to Luther, none of us is privy to another's thoughts
and feelings. 17

The problems attendant upon self-analysis are

all present in the situation.

In addition, since experiences are

private, the data on the basis of which an observer of another
arrives at an estimate of the other's motivation differ from
those on the basis of which one arrives at one's own motivation.
In the former case one is guided by the other's behavior, including reports of his experience (which are unverifiable).

In the

latter case, one remembers his own experience to the best of his
ability.

He cannot both have an experience and be a spectator to

it at the same time.

He can get at it in a spectator sort of

fashion only by memory.

And even there, he is not spectator to

himself having an experience in time past.

He "relives" the.

experience.
16secause of this dual direction of the demonic
impulse, in social ethics a distinction has to be made between
the worth of the action and the worth of the actor, and credit
must be given--even as God does--to the goodness of the act apart
from the character of the actor, even though the actor was not or
is not motivated by God. This is the area of ethics to which
Luther refers as civic righteousness.
17He says, for instance, that the Spirit of God keeps
the saints hidden so the wicked cannot see the glory of God.
WA XVIII, p. 651.

,f,'
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There are some situations where it is necessary for one to
attempt to assess the motivations of another: the clergyman hear/

ing confession, perhaps the psychiatrist, the judge or the paren
Each of us has the tendency to want to pass judgment not only on
the actions, but on the motives of others.

What can one do?

If

one attempts to remain objective and impartial, keeping oneself
uninvolved with the other, viewing the other as though one were
constructing the other's conscious experience to view it as a
spectator, one fails to achieve empathy.

On the other hand, if

one enters subjectively into a common effort at rapport to
achieve maximum communication, one loses objectivity.

One's own

feelings and actions intrude upon the experience to color it.
It is similar to attempting to study some form of wild life by
taking up residence in the midst of it.

One's presence pollutes

the data.
Luther offers a rule of thumb solution to the problem of
evaluating others.

Wherever possible don't evaluate the motives

of others and where it is necessary to evaluate, put the best
construction on what people do. 18
18
An interesting exhibition of Luther's approach is
found in his discussion of sainthood in the De Servo Arbitrio.
11
1 call them [those whom the church has identified as saints]
saints and so regard them; 1 call them Church and so judge them-but by the rule of charity not by the rule of faith. By which 1
mean that charity which a hrays thinks the best of everyone and is
not suspicious, but believes and assumes all good of its neighbor--calls every baptized person a saint. There is no danger
involved if she is wrong; it is the way of charity to be deceived
for she is open to all the uses and abuses of ever man as bein
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Hypocrisy
Figure IV

If M then not A.
Not A.
therefore, M or not M.

/

The fourth and final figure exhibits the fact that the
source of a motivation cannot be determined from the character of
the act if the act itself is not contrary to the law of God.

One

cannot conclude that because the acts to which one is impelled
are not contrary to the law of God, therefore, the impulses come
from God; they might just as·well have a demonic source.

In a

peaceful, contented society during conventional times most impulses tend toward actions consistent with those in agreement
with the law of God.

Because of the difficulty of self-exami-

nation (figure I) it is easy to content oneself with conventional
conformity to the form of God's law, ignoring the conclusion of
the fourth figure, that the motivation for such action can just
as easily be demonic as divine.

Hence, one can quite easily

gradually slip from active involvment with God to quiet hypocrisy.
In summary, then, two fruitful avenues of self-examination
obtain, the first involving comparison of one's god with the
handmaid of all, good and bad, believing and unbelieving, true
and false. Faith, however, calls none a saint but him who is
proclaimed such by divine sentence; for the way of faith is not
to be deceived. Therefore, though we should look on each other
as saints as a matter of charity, none should be declared a saint
as a matter of faith, as if it were an article of faith that so
and so is a saint." .!.£M., pp. 651-652. Bracketed material mine.
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gospel revelation of God; the second involving the testing of our
actions by the law revelation of God.

The former examination is
/

positive and, if successful, can result in proper activity.

The

latter is negative and ought to result in resistance to the
impulse.

If the source of movement is demonic, the resultant

actions themselves may be good or evil qua action.

Finally, the

goodness of the source of motivation cannot be determined from
the goodness of the act.

If one limits his consideration of good

and evil to actions he cannot separate divine from demonic
activity.
In conclusion, while on the ontological level the divine/human relationship is impersonal as God relates Himself indirectly
to men through His ontological operation of the universe and

move~

them as part of His overall creative plan, on the other two
levels--and at the same time--there is a personal relationship.
For God approaches men individually from within on the manichaean
level and confronts them with Himself that He might move them on
the existential level to activity.

Hence, there occurs on

different levels at the same time a transcendent relationship and
an immanent association; an outer encounter and an inner rapport;
a duality of difference and a community of operation.
If good is whatever happens when God moves, a great deal of
what passes our notice in everyday life, the common
tasks of workaday living, are ethically valuable.

ordinary

Unlike many

ethics, Luther's is not an ethics of crisis, involving agonizing
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deliberations over crucial decisions.
that for the most of us anyway.
the

11

But then, life is not like

As Kierkegaard

one~
/

pointed out,

knight of faith 11 looks like an ordinary tax collector.

19

This is not to say that men of God are never called upon to make
difficult decisions.
martyrs.

Some have been rulers.

Some have been

But rulers and martyrs have seldom constituted a

majority of the population of the world.

To construe Christian

ethics in crisis terms, then, is to overdramatize and to generalize the experiences of a few exciting

hist~rical

personages as

typical of the Christian calling and to mislocate the ethical
arena of the human heart in the external world of human affairs.
The latter arena is always more sensational.

In the long light

of eternity, though, it may well be considerably less
19

In

~

and Trembling

significan~

CHAPTER V
MOTIVATION AND LIFE--THE DIRECTION Qf LUTHER'S ETHIC
Roughly speaking, an action has four aspects which more or
less clearly can be distinguished: the end in view, i.e., the
object of the action, the motivation, the act itself and the
emotion or condition of mind 't-7hich accompanies the act or ensues
upon its completion.

A typical ethical approach has developed

centering around each of the·se parts and ba.sing itself upon it
as primary.
Teleological ethical approaches are based upon the consideration of ends or objects of action.

The basic question

teleologists attempt to answer is: what is worth achieving by
human action?

The question may get phrased in different sorts of

ways, e.g., What is man's proper end? or What is good in itself?
or Hhat things or thing have or has intrinsic value?

The succes

ful answering of the first question gives rise to a natural
second question: How can that which is worth achieving be
achieved?

\-lhereas the former question concerned itself with the

end of existence, the latter concerns itself with means to that
end: what sort or sorts of hehavior will bring about the worthwhile state of affairs? 1
1 I have in mind as examples of teleological ethics,
Aristotle's Nicomachaean Ethics and G. E. Moore's Principia
Ethica. I cite these examples with great hesitancy since no
instance can be e uated with a t e of a roach
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While teleological ethical systems may vary in their content, depending on what is taken to be good or valuable, they
/

share a common agreement that ethics concerns itself properly
with determining the sort of life necessary to bring into being
and to preserve that which is most worthwhile.

The sorts of

lives recommended by the differing systems depend upon the ends
espoused; for as soon as the ends are determined, the determination of what sort of life is right follows with little difficulty: that life which will realize those ends.
require different kinds of lives.

Different ends

Therefore, ends determine

actions and ethics properly begins its consideration with ends
men entertain as worthwhile.
The deontological ethical approach by way of contrast, bases
its considerations on actions themselves irrespective of ends.
The basic concept is "right" rather than "good".
of actions are right whereas others are wrong or
indifferent.

Certain sorts
ethic~lly

The ethical life is defined as living rightly.

The task of the ethicist according to this approach is to arrive
at maxims of action which in some way or other can be authenticated as right, to formulate law-like propositions holding for all
of mankind, organized into a canon of ethical prescription. The
goal of the ethicist is to arrive at principles for formulating
or testing the rightness of actions and to develop practical
procedures for determining the appropriate performance of
possible permissible acts which ought to be performed in specific
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situations.

There is only one basic ethical question: What

ought I do? 2
/

/

A third kind of approach focuses on the concomitant of
action, the emotion which is attendant upon it or, more broadly,
the condition of mind which ensues upon the action, to which the
action is intended to give rise.

While there are certainly other

alternatives, in the history of philosophy two varieties of this
kind of ethic have developed, hedonism, both egoistic and altru3
istic, and utilitarianism, or the greatest happiness principle.
This third kind of approach begins with the rather obvious point
that people have likes and dislikes.

The function of ethics then

is to achieve a state of affairs which the actor himself, or as
many people as possible, will like.

A simple ethical system of

this sort in one way or another canvasses the likes and dislikes
of mankind (or however large a segment of mankind the ethicist
considers significant) and proposes a system whereby likes and
dislikes can be quantified.

This achieved, the ethical agent

needs simply to determine what action will maximize the likeable
and minimize the dislikeable results of his behavior and to
2 1 have Kant particularly in mind as an example of
deontology. Cf. his Critique of. Practical Reason
3
Epicurus is the standard of hedonism. The utilitarians of the last century were notably, Bentham and the Mills,
James and John Stuart. Cf. particularly the latter's
Uti 1 ita ria n ism.

"
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perform that act.
More sophisticated ethicists, recognizing the fact that
/

people disagree in their likes and dislikes, attempt to develop
principles for the ranking of likeables and dislikeables, since
some things liked are more worth liking than others.

Such an

ethicist undertakes a double task: not simply to provide a
mathematical formula whereby the most appropriate actions can be
calculated, but also to convince his clientele that certain
things are more worth liking than others, or that the things
which certain persons like are worth more than those liked by
others.
Finally, there is a fourth approach to ethics, the motivational approach, which Luther espoused.
moves the actor to do what he does.

It focuses upon what

The rightness or wrongness

of the actor's action is determined by the motive which gives
rise to the act.

The intent of the ethic is to produce actions

arising from pure motives.

Rather than asking what ought to be

done or achieved, the motivational ethicist attempts to develop
a procedure for self-examination and a method for evaluating
motives. 4
4
Abelard comes first to mind as a voluntarist. See his
Scito ~ Ipsum; then also Kierkegaard, various writings, but particularly Purity of Heart is !2 ~ One Thing. The influence of
existentialism has been widespread and has produced a whole host
of voluntarists, notably in psychology, philosophy and theology.
Note, for instance, Rollo May, Freud and the freudian school by
way of Nietzsche's philosophy, Sartre, Jaspers and Marcel, Barth
.and Tillich to mention ·ust a few.

100

Each of these four approaches to ethics, thus, develop its
own peculiar pattern and structure.
of a perfect ethical world.

Each has its separate vision

The telic vision contemplates a

world of goodness and moderation; the deontic seer visualizes a
world order brought into being by law-abiding people living
peaceably with one another in mutual respect for la"V7 and authority; the hedonic view projects a host of happy untroubled people;
while the voluntarist anticipates a straightforward and honest
world where men communicate with one another in purity of heart
without deception or deceit.
Certainly it would be interesting and profitable to pursue
further and in greater detail the contrasts

be~een

these general

approaches to ethics, but the concern of this book is to exhibit
the unique type of motivational ethics which Luther developed.
As soon as he began with the concept of liberum arbitrium
as an attribute peculiar to God the foundations for Luther's
ethics began to be laid.

When he conceived of ultimate human

reality as subjective forces shaping the human psyche and confronting it in inner experience, inevitably metaphysical questions led to theological and psychological questions.

These

questions, for a complete explanation of human behavior, led to
an examination not only of the role of super-human formative
agencies, but also of the human response to them, i.e., to the
subject of ethics.

Since the area of ethical experience for

Luther is the inner life, that place -v1here the human encounters
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the divine and the demonic immediately, the ethics is motivational.
The problem which Luther poses in this chapter for the
author is some"-1hat different, and considerably more difficult
than that in previous chapters.

For while in chapters two and

three the problem of Luther the philosopher was to organize in
systematic fashion the metaphysical position he espoused, a
position worked out and expressed by Luther, but in random rather
than organized form, here the problem is to develop the ethical
direction entailed by Luther's metaphysical position, an ethical
direction which he himself did not work out, although in his
'\vritings of an ethical character he assumed it.
In his works the philosophic materials available are the
fragments of a thought-out metaphysic, the rudiments of a psychology, and a multitude of practical
ments.

~axims

with supporting

argu~

The ethical rationale which fills the gap between the psy-

chology and the

ro~xims

is missing, remaining to be explicitly

deduced from the psychology and the metaphysics.

Thus, when we

talk of Luther's ethic in this chapter '\ve refer and can refer only
to that which needed to be rendered explicit to complete the
philosophic structure of his.thought and to give foundation and
significance to his particular statements on ethical topics.
Lacking, then, an explicit Lutheran ethical system, we have
attempted only the propaedeutic to it by using the three contrasting approaches to ethics as foils to exhibit how the
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structure of Luther's ethics differs from them and the rationale
which underlies that difference.

In this fashion certain basic

principles for a Lutheran ethic can be isolated.

Each of these

oppositions is epitomized by a concept central to Luther's
thought, which gives direction and focus to his ethical position.
Thus, at least a foundation is laid for the development of an
explicit Lutheran ethic which, whatever its content, can remain
5
true to the formal structure of Luther's thought.
THE ANTI-HEDONIC PRINCIPLE
Hedonic and associated approaches to ethics lack what in
Luther's metaphysic has been identified as an ontological level
of meaning.

The foundation of meaning and value, understandably

then, in hedonic ethics is manichaean, a dichotomy of opposed
ethically significant inner experiences: pleasure and pct:in.
These function as the ultimate values.

The existential level of

5 In what follows I have attempted to reduce the
rationale of each of the contrasting ethical approaches to a
principle set into opposition to Luther's position. This sort of
approach carries with it certain dangers. Inevitably it is
simplicistic, failing to come to grips with the various subtleti$
and sophistications which only the careful analysis of a particular fully developed ethical system can hope to achieve. And yet,
often it is only when we see a structure from a distance, when
the various particularities blend into a simple and unified whole,
that we are able to see its basic dissimilarity to another
structure which in many details it resembles. Since the concern
of the chapter is to clarify the distinctive difference of
Luther's ethical approach, this emphasis on basic difference in
principle lends itself well to the undertaking.
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conscious human activity is devoted to calculation, the weighing
of probable pleasures and pains involved in

alterna~ive

courses

/

of action in the pursuit of the elusive elixir, happiness.
The Good and the Pleasant
Luther's ethical approach is incompatible with the hedonic
primarily for material reasons.

The hedonic approach ultimately

reduces the good to the pleasant, but for Luther anidentity of
the good and the pleasant is achieved only by the free activity
of God.

Ideally a completely good life ought to be a completely

pleasant life.

Hence, for a hedonist to say that the good life

is pleasant is either to utter a proposition which is true by
definition (ostensively true, perhaps) or to use language in some
non-assertive fashion, for the linguistic utterance, though
apparently synthetic, is for him actually a tautology.
For Luther, on the other hand, such a remark is a factual
type statement about experience which may or may not be true,
depending on what is meant by the term "pleasant".

For instance,

if the remark means that the good life is one in which one can
take pleasure, or from which one can derive pleasure, then it is
true.

If it means that the good

life invariably is accompanied

by feelings of pleasure then, as a generalization it is false.
The demonic interference with the ontological operation of the
universe causes the association of good and pleasure on the
existential level always to be contingent.
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The Value of Pleasure and Pain
For Luther pleasure and pain arise from both divine and
demonic sources.

Since both demonic and divine influences give

rise to the pleasures and pains we experience one cannot simply
accept pain as evil and pleasure as good.
unreliable as a moral criterion.

Pleasure is completely

One can take a fiendish or a

saintly pleasure in certain events.

The expected pleasure in a

possible experience can delude us into doing wrong.

The joy of

naughtiness is often its mos·t formidable source of attractiveness.
Pain, on the other hand, is a consistent guide, for pain is
ah-1ays evidence of something wrong.

Insofar as pain is an indi-

cator of something wrong in the situation, it is ethically good
and practically valuable.

But it does not follow from the fact

that pain is good that it is good to be in pain.

This is false

conversion.
One can be pained under two conditions, either because there
is so~~thing evil about the situation with which one, a good man,
is involved, or because one himself is, at least for the moment,
evilly motivated.

A situation or a contemplated course of action

cannot be identified as evil simply because one is pained by it;
one can, however, with surety conclude that evil is involved in
the situation when pain is experienced.

Whether the evil be in

the actor, the situation or the act--some or all of them--is not
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discoverable from the feeling of pain.

-- ---

----

Relation of the Inner and the Outer Life
Luther's ethic

--- ---

is also incompatible with an hedonic ethic

because the hedonic ethic subordinates the outer life to the
inner.

A hedonist acts for the sake of the pleasure which

attends and results from the action.
the feelings which arise from it.

The act is for the sake of

In Luther's ethic the outer

life is the expression of the inner life.
sake of the other.

Neither is for the

Hence, Luther's ethic is outgoing rather than

introverted.
Happiness
The conflict of Luther with the hedonic approa·ch is epitomized by the role of happiness in their ethics.

Whereas hedonism

arrives at happiness as the goal of existence, Luther's ethic
begins with happiness.

Mankind began in the happiness of Eden.

Conversion returns a man to that happy pristine psychic condition
Happiness, for Luther, is the pleasure of God's acquaintance, a
psychic activity which originates temporally although it transcends the temporal in its duration.
If then, happiness is the original natural activity of
man--and therefore good--and if by conversion, God returns that
lost condition to a man, then, the hedonic problem of the man of
God is not, as the hedonist views it, to achieve happiness, but
rather, to avoid losing it.

The good life is the retention of

happiness, not the means of attaining it.
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Happiness which begins as a gift of God is sustained and
renewed through the cathartic action of self-examination by the
law of God, repentance, and the practice of the sacraments.

When

the motivational impulses from God are, thus, freed from the
demonic and strengthened, what then occurs as a natural course
will by its very nature be good and pleasing both to God and to
oneself.

Hence, the anti-hedonic principle of Luther's ethic is:

The function of the ethical life is to retain, not to attain
happiness.

THE ANTI-TELIC PRINCIPLE
Teleological approaches to ethics tend not to develop a
manichaean level of meaning since they need only an ontological
level of value and an existential level of action.

The onto-

logical concern is expressed by the question: What is good in
itself? or What is worth existing?

The concern is satisfied by

the development of a summum bonum or a constellation of goods.
Once goods have been determined there remains only the practical
problem of discovering what sorts of habits need to be engendered
or what sort of way of life needsto be pursued in order to
achieve and retain the good.

No dialectical or limiting level is

necessary in order to complete the system.

Failure to achieve

the good can be explained either in terms of ignorance or weakness of will.
Luther's approach to ethics is inconsistent with a teleological approach primarily for formal reasons, differing on the
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source of the goodness of a life.

Teleology assumes that a life'

good is determined by its end or ends, in contrast to Luther who
traces its good to life's beginnings, the motivations for its
actions.
Differin_g f_sychologi.es
The basis for this disagreement may lie in the differing
psychologies of action assumed by the two approaches.

A telic

type of ethics works with a psychology which assumes that objects
thought or perceived, function as final causes for agents, moving
them to action.

Repetition of action produces habit.

The

peculiar shape or character a life has is determined by its habit
patterns.

Hence, it is the end or ends of action vrhich finally

determine the character of the life, whether good or not.
In Luther's psychology, on the other hand, an impulse to
action rises to consciousness, clothed with meaning and achieving
the possibility of overt expression by focusing upon some object,
appropriate to the situation or not, as an urge to act.

It may

or may not find expression, depending on the self-control of the
actor and the options available to him to expend his energies
productively.

Since the impulse may arise from a divine or a

demonic source and focus upon the same end, it is not the end,
but the source of the impulse which determines what is done.
Since a life is the totality of what is done, the sources of
motivation determine whether the life is good or not.

It is not

what a man has in mind that makes him what he is, but what comes
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from his heart.
The Actor and His Good
In contrast to the criticism of hedonism for subordinating
the outer life to the inner, Luther's criticism of a teleological
approach would tend to be that it subordinates the inner life to
the outer.

It externalizes the good.

which a thing aims.

The good becomes that at

If the thing aims at the

good,tl~good

must

then be external to the thing and is aimed at by the·ethical act.
The agent, then, in his life comes no closer to the good, except
perchance, than external conventional behavior.

His actions con-

form to the good.
Because the telic approach to ethics inevitably tends to
emphasize the primacy of the outer life, since it is action that
achieves the good, the approach tends inevitably to be social in
character.

Hence, it tends to assume that man is by nature a

social animal and to develop i.ts approach on the basis of that
postulate.

Problems of the inner life are simply disturbances

which in one fashion or another can be overcome or avoided by
good habits.
In contrast, Luther's approach to ethics emphasizes the
importance of the inner life in giving shape and character to the
outer life.

What makes an act truly ethical is the commitment of

the agent to his act.
good.

Habitual behavior is at best

conventional~

The spontaneity, the vitality, the immediacy and the per-

sonal devotion to what one does gives actions their particular
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character and value.

The ethical agent does not gather values

from the world about him or rearrange them but rather contributes
value to the v1or ld.
There is a sort of aesthetic aura about the ethical for
Luther.

To be ethical is to be creative, to focus one's spir-

itual energies upon a moment of time to infuse it with goodness.
Actions are good because God is acting through men to perform
them.

A teleological approach inevitably must construe the

ethical effort as bringing good into being. in fact where before
it existed only in idea (the classical shift from the ideal to
the real with all its attendant problems).

For Luther good is

there to begin with, God, who impels the individual to action.
Thus, there is no subordination of the inner to the outer but
a co-ordination of the two as good impulses give rise to good
actions.
Eternal Life
The end of the man of God is eternal life.
exists from the beginning of the ethical life.

For Luther it
St. John, using
/

this expression "eternal life" as a technical expression,

1)(0')

> /
~LtJVlO~ defines it as "knowing Thee the only true God and Jesus

Christ Hhom Thou hast sent,"

6

an activity which under present

conditions is mediated by the Hord of God in the expectation of a

6John 17.3.
.
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future immediate relationship of

knm~ing

and being known.

Hence,

eternal life has both a present and a future significance for the
ethical life and constitutes the final form this present life
will take.
Since, then, the ethical life begins as an eternal life
aimed at a greater fulness of that life, the primary concern of
the man of God is two-fold, first, not to lose the life, now that
he has it, and secondly, to enrich it, that is, to draw closer to
the final goal, the perfect knowledge of God.

How does one

attcl~

a more intimate knowing of God?
God is a person.

Hence, a rather simple answer to the

question is that one gets to know God better in the same way that
one gets to know any person.

There are two problems with getting

to know God better which do not arise with getting to know people
better.

We cannot achieve a more intimate knowledge of God by

means of His body since He lacks a body.

We do, however, possess

the gospel, the record of His incarnation, and His physical
sacramental presence and by means of these can more intimately
know Him.
Secondly, we are presently limited to a mediated knowledge
of Him.

At the same time our knowledge of other persons is

limited by their capacity to reveal themselves, and by ours to be
sensitive to their revelations.

Such personal revelations, how-

ever, are always temporally direct or reasonably direct, whereas
the revelation of Himself to us by God is always mediated
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historically by His \.Jord, our primary source of Divine knowledge.
Even when we have reason to believe that we have evidence of God
expressing Himself immediately to us (e.g., when deciding whether
a given psychic impulse is of divine origin) such evidence is
tested for consistency against the historical expression of God
as gospel.

Otherwise we open ourselves to delusion by the

demonic.
Given then, the primary source of the knowledge of God, we
gain further intimacy with God by speaking to Him and by sensitivity to Him in the ideas and impulses which rise to our
consciousness from Hima secondly, we gain in intimacy with God
through sensitivity to His activity in the lives of others
through whom He speaks and acts.

Finally, we observe the traces

of His activity in the ongoing economy of nature and the course
of world history.

7

Each of these forms of evidence, however, is

limited by the fact that our knowing of God is mediated by His
effects.

We confront Him indirectly.

8

The danger of losing eternal life is to a degree diminished
by increasing its intimacy.
reason.

The qualification is added for this

Even though intimacy with God may increase, demonic

7r have previously identified these sources of knowledge about God as "the action of God as gospel" in chapter IV,
pp. 77 and 78.
8
rn spite of centuries of Luther research comprising a
great volume of material, these vital areas remain relatively
unexplored: the mystical side of Luther's thought, Luther's
natural theology, Luther's psychology and sociology.
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impulses neither cease nor lose their strength so long as the
present conditions of existence continue.

In fact, such impulses
/

may very well gain in strength.

Conseqll;ently, a life of exist-

ence with God is always accompanied by temptation.
level of existence does not cease to be a factor.

The

manichae~

Consequently,

the need for renewal of spirituality remains constant, lest life
lapse back into control by the demonic.
There seems to be some relationship between the strength of
the divine and the demonic.

Perhaps

becau~e

it takes a great

deal of strength on the part of God to overcome a powerfully
demonic drive in an individual, when conversion occurs and the
individual is changed from obedience to the demonic to the divine,
a manifest evildoer sometimes becomes a saint.

Or perhaps be-

cause it takes a very talented person to be a master criminal,
when those same talents are devoted to better things, the same
outstanding behavior, but of a better sort, occurs.
Again, if the divine impulses determining the volitions of a
person increase in strength, the demonic must also increase to
continue to be a temptation.

Consequently, when the temptation

succeeds it may result upon occasion in actions which are gross
and violent, exhibiting the nature and intensity of the impulses
which had previously been resisted.
The dual side of the ethical life of the sinner/saint
exhibits itself, a life both eternal in its character and demonic
in the temptations which beset it.

To construe eternal life in a
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telic fashion is to see life as action for the sake of an eternal
life which awaits the successful completion of the proper course
of actions.

The end awaits the termination of the means and is

divorced temporally from its beginning.

To see it· as Luther sees

it is rather to view eternal life as beginning in this life and
continuing developmentally in a process of fulfillment, expressing itself by actions peculiar to that kind of life, actions,
that is, which are not the means to it, but its products and
reinforcements.

If that life does not begin in this present life

it will not begin in any life to come, for actions do not cause
it to be; rather, the actions occur in the fashion and frequency
that they do because the life already is.

Hence, the anti-telic

principle of Luther is: The goodness of life follows from its
inner motivation rather than from the end at which it aims.
THE ANTI-DEONTIC PRINCIPLE
The deontic approach to ethics appears to contain all three
levels of meaning found in Luther's philosophy.

It contains an

ontological level which may be developed in a metaphysical form
e.g., a notion of a universe operating according to natural
principles of justice, as

th~

expression of a social ideal e.g.,

Kant's kingdom of ends, or perhaps, the idea of a theodicy, as in
Calvin's divine kingdom or that of the latter day Mormons.

The

element common to each of the views is the attempt to reduce the
ethical demands of life to a set or canon of prescriptions or a
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body of duties which have in some sense or another universal
validity.

Since the approach aims at universality, the rules or

laws which are prescribed of necessity must rest on some sort of
absolute or ultimate principle or be testable by some logical
principle or device, e.g., the principle of self-consistency, of
contradiction, etc.
The ontological level tends not to be the source of value,
so much as the context in which the ethical life occurs and which
makes it or its product possible.

Hence, it functions more to

provide the setting, the precondition of ethical behavior rather
than the conditions or prescriptions.

Because of this charac-

teristic of the deontological ontological level, it is possible
to talk in terms of what would be "right" for any possible
world--a kind of remark which would tend to make little or no
sense to a hedonist or teleologist.

Some systems exhibit the

ontology as a desirable outcome, a wished for dream which makes
the devotion to duty worth all the trouble. 9 This is a hedonic
slip which mars the perfection of the approach.
In contrast to the teleological approach, the deontic
approach also requires a manichaean level.

Since the aim of the

ethical law is universal rightness, its natural enemy is
9

One may properly ask, for instance, to what extent
Kant's "kingdom of ends" and the "idea of perpetual peace" serve
as unconscious substitutionary motivations for duty in Kant's
ethics.
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individuality, the moral exception.

Converted to terms of human

psychology, the deontic manichaean dialectic is between rationality, the principle of universality in mind, and inclination,
the attachment to the particular.

The existential level of

ethical action, then, according to the deontic approach, occurs
in the overcoming of inclination by respect for law.
triumphs over personal desire.

Duty

Men hold themselves in restraint

in obedience to the higher laws of reason.
Because the deontic approach apparently contains all three
of Luther's levels of meanings, Lutheran theologians and ethical
philosophers often, beginning with the Leibnizian-WolffianKantian tradition, have attempted to structure the Lutheran
ethical outlook according to a deontic· approach.

The result

inevitably is legalism, a self-frustrating pseudo-religious
ethic,

10 for it is impossible to get a natural existential level

of practical action.
Universality and Subjectivity
The deontic approach suffers from psychological

difficultie~

for the dialectic of the universal versus the personal is resolved by the suppression of the personal and its subsumption to
the universal.

The dialectic--in Kant, for instance, as Hegel

pointed out--is not resolved into a unified existential level of

lOTh e prLme
·
examp 1e o f t h.1s sort o f approac h i s f ound
in Kant's Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.
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action.

Frustration occurs.

One acts at the expense of the

frustrations of one's natural inclinations.
has to deny himself for the sake of duty.

The ethical actor
While this may appear

ethically praiseworthy, it is psychically damaging.
Since action flows naturally from inclination--we follow our
natural bents--the deontic life must, of necessity proceed from
an unnatural devotion to duty.

Artifical springs to action must

be developed out of the frustration of the natural springs to
action.

There is no other possible source.of motility.

Hence,

from a purely psychological standpoint, either no existential
level of action can arise from the manichaean dialectic of inner
experience or an unnatural drive arises out of the trauma of
self-frustration.
Luther's ethical approach differs from the deontic, then,
primarily on grounds of efficiency.
not get the ethical job done.
level.

The deontic approach does

It has no natural existential

In the effort to reduce the ethical life of obedience to

law, the deontic approach discounts and destroys the personal
and the individual.

The deontologist aims at a life of con-

formity to rational rules.

He focuses on the act and, hence,

ignores the actor; gains objectivity at the expense of subjectivity, the norm at the expense of the individual difference,
the proper at the expense of the natural and the "ought" at the
expense of the "is".
process.

Something gets frustrated or lost in the
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The ethical man is depersonalized.

He is not free to be a

person so long as he is bound to a prescribed life.
be a kind of person, a stereotype.

He can only

Thus, the deontic ethic is a

form of servitude.

The very language of this kind of ethics

exhibits the fact.

One has obligations, things to which he is

tied.

He ought i.e., mves, to do this or that.

He has duties,

i.e., there are necessary actions he must perform.

Each of these

betokens a limitation placed upon the individua 1' s freedom to
act.

Since the deontic approach attempts to define ethical

behavior as obedience to law, unique behavior is inimical to that
sort of approach.
For Luther actions which are truly ethical flow from the
inclinations of a man committed to the service of God.
freely done, often without thinking.
from a pure heart.

They are

Acts flow spontaneously

Only when actions flmv from divine motivation

do they have ethical value.

Otherwise they are hypocritical or

forced.
Prescription Versus Diagnosis
For Luther law has an ethical function in personal ethics,
but its function is diagnostic rather than prescriptive.

The

mistake of the deontic approa-ch is to give la,., a positive
function.

As soon as life is prescribed it loses its spontaneity,

its creativity, and its vitality.
will to law is removed are

n~n

Only when the bondage of the

capable of free ethical behavior.

Since duty and inclination are incompatible in the deontic
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approach, there is an inevitable divorce between the inner and
the outer life, between motivation and action.

One can act

rightly for ulterior motives and lead a life of hypocrisy.

One

can be a conformist with little or no commitment to vThat he does
•
or professes. One can, burdened by a sensitive conscience, become immobilized by the tension

bet~-1een

what he wants to do and

what he feels he ought to do, perhaps breaking down ultimately
under the unbearable strain of being put in opposition to himself.
The natural flow of energy is from the ontological to the
manichaean to the existential level.

In the deontic approach,

however, this is the direction of the flow of inclination and
there is

counter-posed to it a movement from the existential--

awareness of the rightness of the

act-~to

votion to duty rather than inclination.

the manichaean--deThe counter-posed forces

meet in the inner life and an irreconcilible conflict is the
result.
Love Versus Duty
While a deontic approach, having rejected natural impulses
to action as ethically unworthy, must create a new motivation for
action, duty; in Luther's approach the problem with inclination
is not that it is evil, but rather that some impulses are evil
and others are not.

Hence, if one acts from good impulses, good

actions naturally result.

No conflict of an individual with him-

self or any frustration of himself for the sake of principle
need occur.

Rather, he can freely express himself in a quite
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natural and uninhibited fashion so long as his motivation is goo
Luther agrees with the deontic approach that the goodness or
evil of a will is determined by its motivation but he disagrees
with the approach when it proposes a respect for duty as the
motivation, proposing instead, the love of God.

11

His anti-

deontic principle is: Love of God, not duty, is the motivation
for the good life.
The expression "love of God" is deliberately ambiguous.
What is meant by it is both ""God loving" [the objective genitive
sense of the expression, denoting ontological activity] and
"loving God" [the subjective genitive sense, denoting existentia 1
activity].

Love is the spring to the ethical act.

flows from it is good.

Whatever

It is natural in that it springs spon-

taneously into consciousness in the urge to act and moves
through conscious deliberation to some form or forms of overt
behavior.

The direction of the motivation is to return back to

God, but since God cannot be affected by action, the impulse is
informed on behalf of God in particular ways toward individual
persons or states of affairs.
Luther's dialectic does not consist in the conflict between
the rational and the passionate, but between divine and demonic
impulses.

Whichever gains the ascendency is freely accepted and

11

The momumental study of love, agape, is Anders
Nygren's Agape and Eros, translated by Philip s. Watson, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953. See especially chapter six of
Part II.
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followed.

The problem of generating a motive to act, a key

problem in deontology, never arises.

Rational capacities are

ethically neutral, functioning prudentially for both criminal and
saint.

They can be used in ancillary fashion to work out the

details for the successful achievement of a desired goal or in
reflexive fashion to analyze or evaluate oneself.

But they can-

not stand in opposition to the passionate nature since they have
no volitional powers to increase the tension of the situation.
Subjectivity
Whereas the deontic approach emphasizes universality and
objectivity, the approach of Luther emphasizes individuality and
subjectivity.

Hence, the final concept which is of primary

importance in Luther's ethical approach emphasizes the uniqueness
of the ethical life.

It is worked out alone by each individual.

He is responsible for himself.
before God for him.

Noone can assume responsibility

Since the ethical life is worked out in the

inner life, exhibiting its presence by outward action, it is of
necessity private.

Although one can reveal

hi~mself

to a degree

to others and solicit their comfort and advice, one is ultimately
alone with himself and his God.
and thinks his thoughts.

Only he experiences his feelings

For this reason Luther argued against

judging one another as persons and as ethical beings.
know with certainty another's motivations.

One cannot

One cannot know the

ultimate commitment of another or whether his untoward act represents a yielding to temptation or not.

Since, then, it is the
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mark of charity to err on the side of the good, one must put the
best construction on the actions of others.
Luther's ethical view is essentially reconciliatory.

He

sees the universe as originally ontological and existential.
Because of the emergence of the manichaean level the opposing
forces must be brought into harmony once again.

The divine

function which in the former ontologico-existential relationship
was purely creative must also be reconstructive that the separation between the ontological and the existential is bridged.
That gap can be closed if a coincidence of the existential life
with the ontological activity of God is achieved by the neutralization of the motivating influence of the demonic in the inner
life.

The reconciliation occurs only where God and men become

attached to one another by bonds of affection and understanding.
Hence, the prerequisite for the ethical life is to know God, to
love Him, and to take pleasure in that activity.

A hedonic

approach leads to idolatry for it deifies a feeling.

A telic

approach lacks the vitality of the relationship with God.
deontic approach inevitably turns man against himself.
ethelic approach is left.

A

Only an

Luther argues that this approach can

resolve the problem of human-existence, but only if that which
is desired is the source of the desiring, if the final cause of
human existence is also its first cause.
and the Omega of existence.

God is both the Alpha

If activity is to be ethical, it

must find its origin in God, feel His promptings in the inner
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life and naturally make its unique way through the particularities of the outer life back to God from Whom it came.
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